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Re: [CFRG] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-11.txt

Kevin Lewi <klewi@cs.stanford.edu> Mon, 10 July 2023 23:06 UTC

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From: Kevin Lewi <klewi@cs.stanford.edu>
Date: Mon, 10 Jul 2023 16:06:16 -0700
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To: Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] I-D Action: draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-11.txt
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Hi Chris,


> One open question we had for the group is captured in #414 [1]. Basically,
> when deriving a Curve25519 private key from some input seed is it
> _necessary_ to apply some form of random oracle or KDF? Currently, we don't
> do this, but it would be trivial to add. Thoughts and feedback welcome!
>
>
I don't think it is necessary to apply a random oracle or KDF to the input
seed -- especially given that the input seed in this context is already
presumed to be a pseudorandom output. But I wanted to bump this question up
again in case others have opinions to share...

Kevin


> After this is resolved, we believe the document is ready for RGLC.
>
> Best,
> Chris
>
> [1] https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque/issues/414
>
> On Thu, Jun 8, 2023, at 5:45 PM, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
> > A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts
> > directories. This Internet-Draft is a work item of the Crypto Forum
> (CFRG) RG
> > of the IRTF.
> >
> >    Title           : The OPAQUE Asymmetric PAKE Protocol
> >    Authors         : Daniel Bourdrez
> >                      Hugo Krawczyk
> >                      Kevin Lewi
> >                      Christopher A. Wood
> >    Filename        : draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-11.txt
> >    Pages           : 79
> >    Date            : 2023-06-08
> >
> > Abstract:
> >    This document describes the OPAQUE protocol, a secure asymmetric
> >    password-authenticated key exchange (aPAKE) that supports mutual
> >    authentication in a client-server setting without reliance on PKI and
> >    with security against pre-computation attacks upon server compromise.
> >    In addition, the protocol provides forward secrecy and the ability to
> >    hide the password from the server, even during password registration.
> >    This document specifies the core OPAQUE protocol and one
> >    instantiation based on 3DH.
> >
> > The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque/
> >
> > There is also an HTML version available at:
> > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-11.html
> >
> > A diff from the previous version is available at:
> > https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque-11
> >
> > Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at rsync.ietf.org:
> :internet-drafts
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> > CFRG@irtf.org
> > https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg
>
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