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Re: [Cfrg] Summary of the poll: Elliptic Curves - signature scheme: friendliness to low memory implementations (ends on June 3rd)

Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com> Fri, 19 June 2015 22:03 UTC

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From: Tony Arcieri <bascule@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 15:03:34 -0700
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To: "Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@ll.mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Summary of the poll: Elliptic Curves - signature scheme: friendliness to low memory implementations (ends on June 3rd)
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On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 1:24 PM, Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL <
uri@ll.mit.edu> wrote:

> Uhh, IMHO we are supposed to be practical even when paranoid. I find it
> certain that we all would be beyond caring by the time collisions are
> produced in SHA-3.
>
> As the expression goes "attacks always get better". I definitely care
about having constructions that would survive SHA-3 collisions, and I also
think they might pose a credible threat in the next two decades or so.

I guess the counterargument is to swear off primitives with fewer sharp
edges due to the constraints of devices that will be obsolete in a few
years? I would prefer to have cryptographic primitives that stand the test
of time.

-- 
Tony Arcieri

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