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Re: [Cfrg] Adoption call for draft-harkins-pkex-05

Greg Rose <ggr@seer-grog.net> Tue, 10 April 2018 19:56 UTC

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From: Greg Rose <ggr@seer-grog.net>
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Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2018 12:56:27 -0700
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Cc: Greg Rose <ggr@seer-grog.net>, Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>, "cfrg@irtf.org" <cfrg@irtf.org>
To: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] Adoption call for draft-harkins-pkex-05
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> On Apr 10, 2018, at 10:59 , Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> wrote:
> 
> 2. What is the problem being solved here?  For example, I think that TLS
> will or does offer PSK authentication.  So, why not just do an out-of-band
> PAKE to establish a PSK, then use PSK-authenticated TLS.  So, to rephrase my
> question: is there some security defect with PSK-authenticated TLS that PKEX
> solves?  Maybe this was discussed already, sorry if I missed it (and am out
> of order).

No comment on your first point. For this one, though, I think the point is to have a standard that allows reaching the goal without riding the elephant of TLS to get there.

Greg.

> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Cfrg [mailto:cfrg-bounces@irtf.org] On Behalf Of Alexey Melnikov
> Sent: Sunday, April 8, 2018 7:42 AM
> To: cfrg@irtf.org
> Subject: [Cfrg] Adoption call for draft-harkins-pkex-05
> 
> Dear CFRG participants,
> This message is starting a 2 weeks adoption call for
> draft-harkins-pkex-05 (Public Key Exchange). From the document's
> Introduction:
> 
>   [RFC7250] further states that "the main security challenge [to using
>   'raw' public keys] is how to associate the public key with a specific
>   entity.  Without a secure binding between identifier and key, the
>   protocol will be vulnerable to man-in-the- middle attacks."
> 
>   The Public Key Exchange (PKEX) is designed to fill that gap: it
>   establishes a secure binding between exchanged public keys and
>   identifiers, it provides proof-of-possession of the exchanged public
>   keys to each peer, and it enables the establishment of trust in
>   public keys that can subsequently be used to facilitate
>   authentication in other authentication and key exchange protocols.
>   At the end of a successful run of PKEX the two peers will have trust
>   in each others exchanged public keys and also share an authenticated
>   symmetric key which may be discarded or used for another purpose.
> 
> The adoption call will last for 2 weeks and will end on April 22nd.
> 
> Thank you,
> Kenny and Alexey
> 
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