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Re: [CFRG] HPKE and Key Wrapping

Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Thu, 31 March 2022 10:34 UTC

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Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 13:34:06 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
To: IRTF CFRG <cfrg@irtf.org>
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Subject: Re: [CFRG] HPKE and Key Wrapping
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On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 04:15:44PM -0400, Russ Housley wrote:
> Martin:
> > 
> > On Tue, Mar 29, 2022, at 20:05, John Mattsson wrote:
> >> Would it make sense to standardize AES-KWP for HPKE or do CFRG believe 
> >> that AES-SIV is the future of key wrapping? Irrespectively I think the 
> >> CFRF should produce a good recommendation on how to use HPKE for key 
> >> wrapping.
> > 
> > What is wrong with the existing HPKE cipher suites for protecting
> > keying materials?  That is, aside from not carrying a NIST
> > approval stamp.
> 
> If you try to apply HPKE to the COSE or JOSE structures, it just does
> not quite fit.  However, by using HPKE to deliver a key-encryption key
> (KEK) to the recipient, the structures fit.  So, it would be really
> nice to use a Key-Wrap algorithm in HPKE to encrypt the KEK.

Not sure about JOSE, but in COSE, the structures do fit even for direct
encryption. COSE-HPKE does not use receipients itself, so it can go into
cose_encrypt0, resulting in direct encryption.



-Ilari

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