Re: [Cfrg] GCM nonce reuse question

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Tue, 02 April 2013 19:53 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Tue, 02 Apr 2013 15:53:04 -0400
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References: <006a01ce2b3c$8f0d03b0$ad270b10$@augustcellars.com> <747787E65E3FBD4E93F0EB2F14DB556B183EF2E3@xmb-rcd-x04.cisco.com> <4E1F6AAD24975D4BA5B1680429673943675A0978@TK5EX14MBXC283.redmond.corp.microsoft.com> <004e01ce2fb9$74979730$5dc6c590$@augustcellars.com> <4EC6AC2C-8EE6-4433-8302-E884DD0B3C06@ve7jtb.com> <6BDAB42A-B894-40E7-ADB9-4DB4337A73EE@vigilsec.com> <3727A8A4-FA6E-4EC2-859C-C1C40E98108E@ve7jtb.com>
To: John Bradley <ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com>
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Subject: Re: [Cfrg] GCM nonce reuse question
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John:

> In CMS the recipient-info values are not normally integrity protected.

Indeed.  If the things that are carried here are altered, then one of two things happens: (1) a value needed to compute the proper key is altered, which prevents the decrypt from working at all; or (2) a value for the recipient to locate their portion of the recipient information is altered, which prevents the intended recipient from decrypting the content.  In either case, the recipient is not fooled into accepting anything that is surprising to the sender.

Russ