Re: [Cfrg] Wack-A-Mole and PKEX 3.0 -> Re: Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-harkins-pkex-00.txt

[Andy Lutomirski <[e-mail]>]

On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 4:17 PM, Dan Harkins <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> On 9/13/16 3:36 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> What I'm saying is: I don't see why a newly-designed enrollment
>> protocol should attempt to prevent you from getting a certificate for
>> your own domain that references Google's public key.  Google's
>> security is not compromised if you possess a certificate for
>> danharkins.com that has Google's public key listed.
>
>
>   For one thing, a CA is only as good as its word. And if it allows people
> to get certificates for identities that bind to other people's public keys
> then its word is shit.
>
>   So let's say you're doing some work for an int'l human rights
> organization.
> But now you've been caught with kiddie porn and are being blackmailed by the
> authorities. Now the gov't is trying to force you to get a certificate
> with your identity (what you refer to as "your own domain") but with a
> public key that belongs to the FBI (what you refer to as "Google's public
> key"). This will allow the FBI to connect to the human rights group (since
> it has the private key) and the human rights group will treat any
> authenticated
> connection as being you and not the FBI. Oops!
>

I don't see how confirming access to the private key helps.  Wouldn't
the gov't just force the victim to get a certificate with a fresh key
and then give the private key to the FBI?  Or, even better, force the
victim to give their existing private key to the FBI, thus preventing
any funny business at all from being seen in the CT logs?