Re: [core] Using SVCB with OSCORE/EDHOC

chrysn <chrysn@fsfe.org> Mon, 27 March 2023 03:00 UTC

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Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2023 05:00:54 +0200
From: chrysn <chrysn@fsfe.org>
To: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
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Subject: Re: [core] Using SVCB with OSCORE/EDHOC
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On Mon, Mar 27, 2023 at 12:41:12AM +0900, Carsten Bormann wrote:
> I wonder if we can defuse the complexity of this by defining the actual data model.

Well, currently we have ongoing work describing EDHOC availability
though link-format ... which is not a great data model on its own. It
also doesn't tackle matters of identity yet, but I think it could (and
that might be a good hint for me to revive rdlink[2]). The metadata
could then also contain information about how to verify the peer (eg. by
giving its CCS or an id / id_cred pair contianing a CCS), which would
allow links to be securely followable without prior relation to the RS
... leading us once more to unanswered questions about our web security
model.

BR
c

[1]: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc-07.html#name-web-linking
[2]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-amsuess-t2trg-rdlink/