[core] Security (again)
"Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com> Sun, 18 December 2011 10:47 UTC
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Date: Sun, 18 Dec 2011 12:47:20 +0200
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From: "Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)" <hannes.tschofenig@nsn.com>
To: core@ietf.org
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Subject: [core] Security (again)
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Hi all, since you may not be subscribed to the TLS working group mailing list I thought I should share some information about ongoing activities with relevance to you. During the Taipei IETF TLS meeting to remove the functionality of conveying a public key fingerprint from draft-wouters-tls-oob-pubkey. I did that already during that meeting with the submission of http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wouters-tls-oob-pubkey-02. I had posted a mail about this the currently ongoing consensus call (see http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg08290.html). The removed functionality is not gone but rather part of a different document, namely http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-10 >From the abstract of the draft: " This extension allows the TLS client to inform a server of cached information from previous TLS handshakes, allowing the server to omit sending cached static information to the client during the TLS handshake protocol exchange. " This functionality is useful for the constrained environments you guys are working on. Receiving feedback from this community would be great. If you get confused by all this TLS stuff drop me a mail. Ciao Hannes
- [core] Security (again) Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo)