Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case
Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> Sat, 05 September 2015 11:41 UTC
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To: Göran Selander <goran.selander@ericsson.com>, "cose@ietf.org" <cose@ietf.org>
References: <55E400AC.7090507@gmx.net> <D20F54E9.34F4C%goran.selander@ericsson.com>
From: Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>
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Date: Sat, 05 Sep 2015 13:41:11 +0200
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Subject: Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case
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Hi Goeran, I completely agree with you that having an already established security context will be common for a number of use cases. I posted the use case for multicast in the lighting environment since this is something I am currently working on with Sandeep and Abhinav. The OAuth access token is another such use case. Ciao Hannes On 09/04/2015 03:15 PM, Göran Selander wrote: > Hi, > > Independently of the multicast use case, there is a secure communication > setting that is similar to this example which I think deserves being > considered in COSE. > > What I expect to be a common setting is that the receiver has already > established a security context, including algorithm, key, sequence > number/used nonces etc. with a context identifier that is locally unique. > In this case the only information that needs to be passed in the message > is context identifier and nonce/sequence number together with ciphertext + > tag. > > You may of course argue that you should use the existing COSE_encrypt > format. But since a) the assumptions are quite different, b) the > optimizations may be significant and c) this may be a common mode of > operation, I think it actually deserves a (sub-)format of its own. If we > don’t define this in COSE, someone may be tempted to do this elsewhere. > > > Regards > Göran > > > > On 2015-08-31 09:22, "Hannes Tschofenig" <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote: > >> Hi Jim, Brian, all, >> >> I am trying to compare the work on multicast security done by Sandeed & >> co against an application layer solution using CBOR/COSE. >> >> The DTLS multicast includes the following relevant components: >> - Epoch: 2 Byte >> - Sender ID: 1 Byte >> - Sequence Number: 5 Byte >> >> The combination of epoch, sender id and sequence number are used as a >> nonce for the cipher and the use of the sender id ensures that no member >> of the group accidentally selects values that will cause re-use. >> >> The 1 byte sender id is chosen small to reflect the expected size of a >> group in the professional lighting environment, as explained in the DTLS >> multicast document. >> >> Ciphersuite related information includes: >> - Encrypted Content (variable length) >> - MAC (variable length) >> >> Content Type, Version and Length are DTLS-specific aspects that cannot >> be removed without re-design of the record layer. >> >> Data based on Figure 4 of >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-keoh-dice-multicast-security-08.txt. >> >> Since there is no sequence number defined in COSE I put the epoch and >> the sequence number together into the nonce field. >> >> Here is the commented version of the COSE message I came up with: >> >> [ >> 2, // Encrypted COSE message >> { >> 1: 10, // Algorithm - AES-CCM-16-64-128 >> 5: h'89f52fa' // 7-byte nonce >> }, >> h'7b9dcfa42c4e1d3182c402dc18ef8b5637de4fb62cf1dd156ea6e6e0', >> // encrypted payload. >> [ >> [ >> h'', >> { >> 1: -6, // Direct use of CEK >> 4: h'01' // Key ID - 0x01 >> }, >> h'' >> ] >> ] >> ] >> >> According to cbor.me the resulting COSE encoding has 59 bytes whereby 28 >> bytes are purely used for message encryption. This means that there is >> 31 bytes overhead with COSE compared to 12 bytes [= 8 for Epoch + >> Sequence Number + Sender ID, 3 bytes for Content Type and Version fields]. >> >> Ciao >> Hannes >> >
- [COSE] Multicast Use Case Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Jim Schaad
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Sandeep Kumar
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Jim Schaad
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Kumar, Sandeep
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Carsten Bormann
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Stephen Farrell
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Göran Selander
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Somaraju Abhinav
- Re: [COSE] Multicast Use Case Jim Schaad