Re: [COSE] [jose] Call for Adoption: draft-jones-jose-fully-specified-algorithms

Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries> Mon, 08 January 2024 15:07 UTC

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From: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2024 09:07:02 -0600
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To: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
Cc: Neil Madden <neil.e.madden@gmail.com>, Karen ODonoghue <kodonog@pobox.com>, jose@ietf.org, cose <cose@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [COSE] [jose] Call for Adoption: draft-jones-jose-fully-specified-algorithms
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Another comment since Manu pointed out that this could complicate the
ecosystem further, the suites defined in Verifiable Credential Data
Integrity 1.0, have the same issue:

https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-integrity/#cryptographic-suites

IIRC:

"cryptosuite": "eddsa-2022", is actually Ed25519EdDSA

"cryptosuite": "eddsa-2025", could be Ed448EdDSA

"cryptosuite": "eddsa-2022", is actually ECDSA with secp256r1

"cryptosuite": "eddsa-2025", could be ECDSA with secp384r1

As I understand it, data integrity cryptosuites are fully specified, and
even beyond cryptographic dependencies, there is application pre-processing
that is fully specified for example:

 "cryptosuite": "jcs-eddsa-2022", uses JCS, whereas the other suites use
RDF Data Set Canonicalization.

Of course none of these suites rely on JOSE or COSE algorithm definitions,
but since they are new work, and seem to be attempting to provide easy to
understand names for fully specified algorithms, perhaps they should also
take Neil's advice and omit these algorithm identifiers all together and
simple rely on the key type to restrict the algorithm used... His blog post
appears to be just as relevant to data integrity as it is to "alg" being
mandatory in JOSE headers:
https://neilmadden.blog/2018/09/30/key-driven-cryptographic-agility/

Manu, if the draft in question did not make any new registrations, but did
provide guidance that reduced debate on naming and captured IETF consensus
on how to name suites (as you appear to be doing for data integrity suites
in W3C), would that be worth adopting?

OS

On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 8:33 AM Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
wrote:

> On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 4:19 AM Neil Madden <neil.e.madden@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > It’s pretty clear that we’re just talking past each other now. I’ve made
> the points I wanted to make. I don’t think you have addressed any of them,
> so I still don’t support adoption of this draft.
>
> I found Neil's concerns compelling.
>
> For better or worse, JOSE uses "polymorphic" algorithm identifiers and
> that's the way things have worked for a long time. The Working Group
> was warned that this was not a good idea at the time, but rough
> consensus landed in the "polymorphic" camp and that's what the
> ecosystem does today.
>
> Adding more options to support both "polymorphic" and "fully
> specified" approaches creates additional complexity that will lead to
> interoperability failures. Don't complicate the ecosystem more than it
> already is.
>
> I do not support the adoption of this draft for the reasons Neil
> mentioned as well as the reasons stated above.
>
> -- manu
>
> --
> Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/
> Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc.
> https://www.digitalbazaar.com/
>


-- 


ORIE STEELE
Chief Technology Officer
www.transmute.industries

<https://transmute.industries>