[COSE] Re: Call for adoption of draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke

tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> Mon, 09 December 2024 10:24 UTC

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From: tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2024 15:53:59 +0530
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To: Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
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Subject: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke
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Hi all,

I have published a revised draft (
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-05.html)
which addresses all comments raised, particularly from Orie and Ilari.  The
draft appears ready for adoption.

Cheers,
-Tiru
On Fri, 6 Dec 2024 at 15:36, tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Orie,
>
> I raised a PR https://github.com/tireddy2/Hybrid-KEM-with-COSE-JOSE/pulls
> to use "AKP".
>
> Cheers,
> -Tiru
>
> On Thu, 5 Dec 2024 at 04:05, Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
> wrote:
>
>> Changing "crv" is indeed not possible at this point.... but we are not
>> required to use "crv" to express pqc or hybrid keys.
>>
>> The document that enables an "alg" to be used in a message can also
>> specify which "kty" and other parameters are required to be present when
>> that alg is expressed in a key.
>>
>> We are comparing:
>>
>> ### Option A
>>
>> const jwk = {
>>     kty: "AKP", // mandatory
>>     alg: "X-Wing", // mandatory
>>     pub: "4iNrNajCSz...tmrrIzQSQQO9lNA", // mandatory
>>     priv: "f5wrpOiP...rPpm7yY", // mandatory
>> };
>>
>> ### Option B
>>
>> const jwk = {
>>     kty: "OKP", // mandatory
>>     crv: "X-Wing", // mandatory
>>     alg: "X-Wing", // optional
>>     x: "4iNrNajCSz...tmrrIzQSQQO9lNA", // mandatory
>>     d: "f5wrpOiP...rPpm7yY" // mandatory
>> };
>>
>> I'm saying let's go with Option A.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 4:22 PM Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg@google.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I would really like to avoid a reality where someone uses the separate
>>> parts of an X-Wing key in their own primitives, that way lies madness and
>>> vulnerabilities. COSE should treat hybrids just like any other algorithm,
>>> and pretend to not know anything about how the opaque blob of bytes
>>> operates.
>>> As for unfortunate naming decisions, there is some precedent here, with
>>> TLS calling everything a group. Kind of unfortunate and "algorithm
>>> parameter" or similar would have been the far better term for it, but I
>>> somewhat assume that changing this name at this point is infeasible. (An
>>> overly pendadic person might point out though, that Z[X]/(X^256+1)^3 is, as
>>> a module of a number field order, by definition still a group, and that
>>> Z[X](X^256+1) has Dedekind dimension one, which means that it would be fair
>>> to say that at least Spec Z[X]/(X^256+1) is a curve, so we are still
>>> talking about a vector bundle over a curve)
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 4, 2024 at 6:25 AM tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Thanks Orie for valuable inputs, raise PRs for both the drafts, see
>>>> https://github.com/tireddy2/Hybrid-KEM-with-COSE-JOSE/pull/4
>>>> and
>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/pull/11.
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 at 20:08, Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Sure, but that is a problem for:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-hpke/
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/
>>>>>
>>>>> Consider what the example you gave above means in a pre-hpke world:
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>>       "kty": "OKP",
>>>>>       "crv": "X25519",
>>>>>       "algorithms": ["ECDH-ES+A128KW", "ECDH-ES+A256KW"],
>>>>>       "x": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs",
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> The algorithms in the key are for key establishment / key wrapping...
>>>>> not content encryption.
>>>>>
>>>>> HPKE is adding the idea of enabling "direct integrated encryption".
>>>>> ... and in doing so, enabling you to use a key wrapping algorithm
>>>>> which is also a content encryption algorithm and which is an hpke aead.
>>>>> If that's a bad idea, we are not making it better by adding PQ/T
>>>>> hybrids to it, or enabling multiple HPKE suites to be used for the same KEM
>>>>> key.
>>>>>
>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9180#name-kem-key-reuse
>>>>>
>>>>> So while HPKE might allow the same kem key to be used with multiple
>>>>> AEADs, there is no reason that JOSE and COSE should allow it...
>>>>> *Because this use case is solved for in the 2 layer constructions in
>>>>> JOSE and COSE.*
>>>>>
>>>>> I consider it to be a bad idea to advertise multiple key encryption /
>>>>> key wrapping algorithms for a single kem key pair.
>>>>>
>>>>> Let's look at a complete example of X-Wing in JOSE starting with the
>>>>> recipient public key:
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>>     "kty": "AKP",
>>>>>     "kid":
>>>>> "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s",
>>>>>     "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM",
>>>>>     "pub": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs",
>>>>>     "priv": "i20zlCBQr0...JsShVkf3q4qUc"
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> ^ such a key can be used for both integrated encryption and 2 key
>>>>> encryption in both JOSE and COSE.
>>>>>
>>>>> You can encrypt directly to this key using A256GCM,
>>>>> and indirectly by using HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM to encrypt a
>>>>> content encryption key, and then using any of the algorithms registered
>>>>> here:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-signature-encryption-algorithms
>>>>> ... that support "enc" ... (ChaCha20Poly1305 is not in this registry btw).
>>>>>
>>>>> ## Integrated Encryption (X-Wing HPKE JWT)
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>>   "protectedHeader": {
>>>>>     "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM",
>>>>>     "enc": "dir",
>>>>>     "kid": "
>>>>> urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s
>>>>> "
>>>>>   },
>>>>>   "payload": {
>>>>>     "urn:example:claim": true,
>>>>>     "iss": "urn:example:issuer",
>>>>>     "aud": "urn:example:audience",
>>>>>     "iat": 1729785491,
>>>>>     "exp": 1729792691
>>>>>   }
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> ## Key Encryption (Multiple recipients, using the same content
>>>>> encryption algorithm)
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>>   "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0", // { "enc" : "A128GCM" }
>>>>>   "iv": "ZL0HDvZJizA6vyTV",
>>>>>   "ciphertext": "Oq26x9vppULrGNzCn2j...BgQpgJPchg0eWNmgv4Ozi5I",
>>>>>   "tag": "ULnlOiJRYfCzM_r5j9sLEQ",
>>>>>   "aad": "cGF1bCBhdHJlaWRlcw",
>>>>>   "recipients": [
>>>>>     {
>>>>>       "encrypted_key": "G3HmlpOgA4H...w7svDwUqvNR",
>>>>>       "header": {
>>>>>         "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:
>>>>> cxQC_lWt22BIjH5AWSLHCZk_f-mU3-W4Ztcu5-ZbwTk",
>>>>>         "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
>>>>>         "epk": {
>>>>>           "kty": "OKP",
>>>>>           "crv": "X25519",
>>>>>           "x": "JnGWSQ90hlt0H7..._Dn_CkLzE",
>>>>>         }
>>>>>       }
>>>>>     },
>>>>>     {
>>>>>       "encrypted_key": "pn6ED0ijngCiWF8...mRF7QarTVfuWj6dw",
>>>>>       "header": {
>>>>>         "alg": "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-A256GCM",
>>>>>         "kid":
>>>>> "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s",
>>>>>         "ek":
>>>>> "BI41YDnhTTI6jSd7T62rLwzC...X9UXDw_3ylbXTiYWmPXl2fNmr4BeQ"
>>>>>       }
>>>>>     }
>>>>>   ]
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> Some comments on kem key reuse:
>>>>>
>>>>> In the example above, assume the X25519 ECDH-ES+A128KW part is to the
>>>>> x25519 component of the X-Wing key.
>>>>> When a CRQC breaks ECDH-ES, the encrypted content encryption key is
>>>>> broken, and the attacker can ignore x-wing completely, and still recover
>>>>> the plaintext.
>>>>> This remains true when any recipient in a 2 layer uses any of the
>>>>> traditional 2 layer algorithms in the JOSE and COSE registries today
>>>>> (except for psk stuff mixed into kdfs).
>>>>>
>>>>> In the case of direct encryption to the x25519 component of an x-wing
>>>>> key, the plaintext is also recovered.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only way to protect against both modes is to use X-Wing for both
>>>>> integrated encryption and key encryption and to always use the full x-wing
>>>>> algorithm with a given x-wing key, and in the case of multiple recipients,
>>>>> to ensure that each recipient is using a PQ key encryption / key wrapping
>>>>> algorithm.... because in 2 layer breaking a single recipient encrypted
>>>>> content encryption key recovers plaintext.
>>>>>
>>>>> OS
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 3, 2024 at 6:57 AM tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks Orie for the detailed explanation. I understand your
>>>>>> suggestion to use "AKP" instead of "OKP," but "AKP" has limitations,
>>>>>> particularly with the HPKE PQ/T scheme. For example, in the HPKE, a single
>>>>>> key agreement mechanism can be paired with multiple AEAD algorithms,
>>>>>> resulting in unique cryptographic algorithm identifiers. For instance:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    - HPKE-XWING-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305
>>>>>>    - HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM
>>>>>>
>>>>>> To address this, the key type "AKP" would need to be extended to
>>>>>> accommodate multiple algorithms. A possible JSON representation could look
>>>>>> like this:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> {
>>>>>>     "kty": "AKP",
>>>>>>     "kid": "01",
>>>>>>     "algorithms": [
>>>>>>         "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305",
>>>>>>         "HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM"
>>>>>>     ],
>>>>>>     "key_ops": [
>>>>>>         "deriveBits",
>>>>>>         "wrapKey"
>>>>>>     ]}
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -Tiru
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, 3 Dec 2024 at 02:25, Orie Steele <orie@transmute.industries>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url1=draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-03&url2=draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-04&difftype=--hwdiff
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Further comments:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> X-Wing is not an Elliptic Curve.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> X-Wing keys using OKP and (ab)using the "crv" parameter to mean
>>>>>>> "curve with parameters + lattice with parameters"... is something I
>>>>>>> really hope we can decide not to do.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As I said in
>>>>>>> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cose/LMh6LpT5aqF5m47dmQ_roWU18eM/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It would be nice to agree to use keys for algorithms, and to use AKP
>>>>>>> for ML-KEM and ML-DSA, and X-Wing with HPKE, and X-Wing without HPKE... and
>>>>>>> all of this is possible with the use of the AKP key type with fully
>>>>>>> specified algorithms.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-dilithium-04#name-algorithm-key-pair-type
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Obviously I disagree with Ilari on this point.
>>>>>>> .... however, I hope we can agree that whatever we do for ML-DSA, it
>>>>>>> will work for ML-KEM and X-Wing, and HPKE... or whatever CRFG comes up with
>>>>>>> next.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *In summary, it's nice that the HPKE algorithms have been added, but
>>>>>>> I object to the key representation using OKP.*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Motivation for my objection to the use of OKP for ML-KEM keys:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Consider that OKP is commonly considered reserved for "elliptic
>>>>>>> curve points", as noted in
>>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8152#section-12.4.2
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8037.html#section-2
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    Note: Do not assume that there is an underlying elliptic curve,
>>>>>>>    despite the existence of the "crv" and "x" parameters.  (For
>>>>>>>    instance, this key type could be extended to represent
>>>>>>> Diffie-Hellman
>>>>>>>    (DH) algorithms based on hyperelliptic surfaces.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It does not matter how many times I read the note above, the
>>>>>>> normative MUST says:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>   o  The parameter "crv" MUST be present and contain the subtype of
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>       key (from the "JSON Web Elliptic Curve" registry).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This means we are required to put things that are not curves in a
>>>>>>> registry for curves....
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the algorithm param "alg" is not mandatory for an X-Wing key, can
>>>>>>> I use the same key for ML-KEM and X25519 and X-Wing?
>>>>>>> Do I have to put "alg" in the key, even though it's optional (in
>>>>>>> OKP) to signal a safer use pattern?
>>>>>>> If I encrypt with X25519 to an X-Wing key that has no "alg"
>>>>>>> parameter, what happens?... is it ok, if I use the X25519 component to
>>>>>>> decrypt? it works... is this legal?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> {
>>>>>>>       "kty": "OKP",
>>>>>>>       "crv": "X-Wing", // not a curve... just means x and d cannot
>>>>>>> be validated... unless you know the intended algorithm
>>>>>>>       "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW", // HPKE-XWING-SHA256-AES256GCM
>>>>>>> // HPKE-X25519-SHA256-CHACHA20POLY1305
>>>>>>>       "x": "KIWi1p4buN7...N8zkhfF8pGs", // 2 public keys
>>>>>>>       "d": "i20zlCBQr0...JsShVkf3q4qUc" // 2 private keys or a
>>>>>>> single seed for both private keys
>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The thumbprints will be different ...
>>>>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-key-thumbprint-06#name-octet-key-pair-okp
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Even if the same private key can decrypt messages to each public key
>>>>>>> that contains "somewhere (no validation)" the necessary components....
>>>>>>> The thumbprint for a hybrid public key should include the algorithm
>>>>>>> used to construct the hybrid, not just the public keys used with any
>>>>>>> component algorithms or the hybrid.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Either we should scrap the AKP concept and use OKP as Ilari
>>>>>>> suggested.
>>>>>>> ... or we should not use OKP for new "subtype"s... and especially
>>>>>>> not for hybrids.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't know if this comment should gate working group adoption, but
>>>>>>> it certainly seems it should gate a WGLC for either document that
>>>>>>> references ML-KEM / ML-DSA .
>>>>>>> Thanks to Russ, Neil and others who gave WGLC feedback on AKP and
>>>>>>> ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE, I am tracking your comments here:
>>>>>>> https://github.com/cose-wg/draft-ietf-cose-dilithium/issues but
>>>>>>> have not yet addressed them.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ilari, Hannes and Tiru, please feel free to file a WGLC comment on
>>>>>>> the use of AKP in ML-DSA.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Whatever the outcome, there should be alignment on seeds, private
>>>>>>> keys, public keys and algorithms for lattice and hybrid PQC (ML-DSA /
>>>>>>> ML-KEM / X-Wing)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "pub" is better than "x"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "priv" is better than "d"
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "alg" should have been mandatory in keys,
>>>>>>> ... and forbidden in headers ( a ship that has sailed, and can't be
>>>>>>> fixed for EC2 / OKP keys, or JWE / COSE Encrypt envelopes )...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *...things that are not elliptic curves do not belong in a
>>>>>>> registry for elliptic curves...*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I will die on these hills. If I'm in the rough, it would be good to
>>>>>>> know.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> OS
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 2, 2024 at 11:11 AM Michael Jones <
>>>>>>> michael_b_jones@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ilari, Orie, and Mike P., do you believe that your comments on the
>>>>>>>> previous draft have been addressed in this one?  If not, what further
>>>>>>>> changes would you suggest?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thanks all,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>                                                                 --
>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *From:* tirumal reddy <kondtir@gmail.com>
>>>>>>>> *Sent:* Monday, December 2, 2024 5:29 AM
>>>>>>>> *To:* Michael Jones <michael_b_jones@hotmail.com>
>>>>>>>> *Cc:* cose@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> *Subject:* Re: [COSE] Re: Call for adoption of
>>>>>>>> draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The revised draft
>>>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke-04.html
>>>>>>>> addresses all the comments raised during the WG adoption call. Regarding
>>>>>>>> Michael's comment on the terms 'traditional' and 'Post-Quantum,' this issue
>>>>>>>> has been discussed in the PQUIP WG. However, no decision has been made to
>>>>>>>> change the terminology, and this issue is beyond the scope of this
>>>>>>>> document
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> -Tiru
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Sat, 30 Nov 2024 at 22:42, Michael Jones <
>>>>>>>> michael_b_jones@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Only two replies to the call for adoption clearly stated that they
>>>>>>>> favored adoption.  Whereas more messages were sent than that with critiques
>>>>>>>> of the draft.  Therefore, the draft is not adopted in its present form.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The chairs suggest that the authors update the specification to
>>>>>>>> address the feedback from Ilari, Orie, Mike P., and Michael R. and publish
>>>>>>>> a new draft, and then ask for feedback on the revised draft on the mailing
>>>>>>>> list.  Following that, we can consider a call for adoption of the revised
>>>>>>>> draft.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>                                                                 For
>>>>>>>> the chairs,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>                                                                 --
>>>>>>>> Mike
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *From:* Michael Jones
>>>>>>>> *Sent:* Friday, November 8, 2024 7:04 AM
>>>>>>>> *To:* cose@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> *Subject:* Call for adoption of
>>>>>>>> draft-reddy-cose-jose-pqc-hybrid-hpke
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Per discussions at the IETF 121 COSE working group meeting, this
>>>>>>>> note starts a two-week call for adoption of the PQ/T Hybrid KEM: HPKE with
>>>>>>>> JOSE/COSE specification.  Please let us know whether you are in favor of
>>>>>>>> adoption or not by Friday, November 22, 2024.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thank you,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>                                                                 --
>>>>>>>> Mike & Ivo
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> COSE mailing list -- cose@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe send an email to cose-leave@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>>> COSE mailing list -- cose@ietf.org
>>>>>>>> To unsubscribe send an email to cose-leave@ietf.org
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ORIE STEELE
>>>>>>> Chief Technology Officer
>>>>>>> www.transmute.industries
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> <https://transmute.industries>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ORIE STEELE
>>>>> Chief Technology Officer
>>>>> www.transmute.industries
>>>>>
>>>>> <https://transmute.industries>
>>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> COSE mailing list -- cose@ietf.org
>>>> To unsubscribe send an email to cose-leave@ietf.org
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> Sophie Schmieg | Information Security Engineer | ISE Crypto |
>>> sschmieg@google.com
>>>
>>>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
>> ORIE STEELE
>> Chief Technology Officer
>> www.transmute.industries
>>
>> <https://transmute.industries>
>>
>