Re: [COSE] COSE Support for AES-CTR and AES-CBC

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Sat, 05 November 2022 16:29 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Sat, 05 Nov 2022 12:28:58 -0400
Cc: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>, Sophie Schmieg <sschmieg=40google.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "Arciszewski, Scott" <scottarc@amazon.com>, "Zundel, Brent" <brent.zundel@avast.com>, "cose@ietf.org" <cose@ietf.org>
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To: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
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Subject: Re: [COSE] COSE Support for AES-CTR and AES-CBC
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Carsten:

>> I'm trying to see how the recipient would find this helpful.  It is just another value that would need to be adjusted by the attacker to mount the attacks that Sophie is sharing.
> 
> A naive recipient would benefit from not mistaking the COSE items to be authenticated encryption.  All other attacks might remain possible, but would contain the big flag that they use unauthenticated encryption.
> 
> (So this may be not a strict security improvement, but only an improvement of "security in the presence of implementers".)

The Security Considerations is already longer than the rest of the document.  And, the specification already says that AES-CTR MUST be used with some other integrity mechanism.  In the SUIT environment, the integrity mechanism a digital signature.

Russ