Re: [COSE] Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-cose-countersign-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org> Thu, 08 September 2022 05:47 UTC

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From: Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>
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Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2022 07:47:40 +0200
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-cose-countersign@ietf.org, Cose Chairs Wg <cose-chairs@ietf.org>, cose <cose@ietf.org>, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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To: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>
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Subject: Re: [COSE] Paul Wouters' Discuss on draft-ietf-cose-countersign-09: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On 2022-09-08, at 04:14, Paul Wouters via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
>        gem install cbor-diag
> 
> I am concerned about adding install commands for "programs from the internet"
> within an RFC. If the rubygem for some reason becomes malicious, we cannot
> pull it from the RFC (even if we pull it from the datatracker link, it would
> still live on in copies of the RFC elsewhere and malicious people could point
> to copies of those original RFCs to point people to downlod the malicious rubygem.
> 
> I would be okay with an iet.org download location of a ruby gem.

“gem install” is the appropriate way to install rubygems software, not a “location of a rubygem”.

What you seem to be asking for is some indirection so we can swap out the name of the gem in case cbor-diag becomes rogue.  That does make some sense to me, but we’d need to install that indirection somewhere in a place maintained by the IETF.

➔ “Please consult https://www.ietf.org/software/cbor-diag for the way to install this software”.
And that page would contain instructions including “gem install cbor-diag” until that goes rogue.

Can we get such a infrastructure of pages recommending software up and running?  Do we mire ourselves in process issues (who gets change control etc.)?

Data point from a quick search:
The RFCs that already suggest installing rubygems via a direct “gem install” include RFC 8152, RFC 8610, RFC 9052.

(In reality, I’d expect the rubygems organization to act more quickly on a report of cbor-diag going rogue than the IETF would.)

Grüße, Carsten