[Curdle] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8270 (5501)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Fri, 21 September 2018 20:33 UTC

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Subject: [Curdle] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC8270 (5501)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8270,
"Increase the Secure Shell Minimum Recommended Diffie-Hellman Modulus Size to 2048 Bits".

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You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5501

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Type: Editorial
Reported by: Eugene Adell <eugene.adell@gmail.com>

Section: 3

Original Text
-------------
[RFC4419] specifies a recommended minimum size of 1024 bits for k,
   which is the modulus length of the DH group.  It also suggests that,
   in all cases, the size of the group needs be at least 1024 bits.

Corrected Text
--------------
[RFC4419] specifies a recommended minimum size of 1024 bits for k,
   which is the modulus length of the DH group.  It also suggests that,
   in all cases, the size of the group needs to be at least 1024 bits.

Notes
-----
small typo

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-------------
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--------------------------------------
RFC8270 (draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-dh-group-exchange-06)
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Title               : Increase the Secure Shell Minimum Recommended Diffie-Hellman Modulus Size to 2048 Bits
Publication Date    : December 2017
Author(s)           : L. Velvindron, M. Baushke
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG