Re: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC9142 (7799)

On Thu, Feb 8, 2024 at 10:10 AM Deb Cooley <debcooley1@gmail.com> wrote:

> Out of idle curiosity, why 'hold for update'?  Not 'verified'?
>

I ask myself that all the time and I think the IESG advise at
https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/processing-errata-ietf-stream/
not too helpful either.

I have used hold for document update if there is a chance that there will
be a new document, and verified for when I'm pretty sure this document will
never be updated again. So lets say an errata for TLS 1.0 I would say
"verify" but for TLS 1.3 I would say "hold for document update",

Paul

>
> Deb Cooley
>
> On Wed, Feb 7, 2024 at 11:51 AM Paul Wouters <paul.wouters=
> 40aiven.io@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>> On Feb 7, 2024, at 11:20, mbaushke ietf <mbaushke.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >
>> > The suggested revision is correct.
>> >
>> > The nistp521 curve provides 256 bits of estimate security strength.
>> >
>> > Please approve the update.
>> >
>> >        -- M. Baushke (author of RFC9142)
>>
>> Done. Thanks all!
>>
>> Paul
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >> On Feb 7, 2024, at 7:13 AM, RFC Errata System <
>> rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC9142,
>> >> "Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure
>> Shell (SSH)".
>> >>
>> >> --------------------------------------
>> >> You may review the report below and at:
>> >> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7799
>> >>
>> >> --------------------------------------
>> >> Type: Technical
>> >> Reported by: Ben S <ben.s3@ncsc.gov.uk>
>> >>
>> >> Section: 1.2.1
>> >>
>> >> Original Text
>> >> -------------
>> >> +============+=============================+
>> >> | Curve Name | Estimated Security Strength |
>> >> +============+=============================+
>> >> | nistp256   | 128 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | nistp384   | 192 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | nistp521   | 512 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | curve25519 | 128 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | curve448   | 224 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >>
>> >> Corrected Text
>> >> --------------
>> >> +============+=============================+
>> >> | Curve Name | Estimated Security Strength |
>> >> +============+=============================+
>> >> | nistp256   | 128 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | nistp384   | 192 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | nistp521   | 256 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | curve25519 | 128 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >> | curve448   | 224 bits                    |
>> >> +------------+-----------------------------+
>> >>
>> >> Notes
>> >> -----
>> >> P-521 has approximately 256 bits of security (rather than 512), as per
>> Table 1 of Section 6.1.1 of FIPS 186-5, and Section 9 Paragraph 5 of RFC
>> 5656.
>> >>
>> >> Instructions:
>> >> -------------
>> >> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". (If it is spam, it
>> >> will be removed shortly by the RFC Production Center.) Please
>> >> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>> >> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party
>> >> will log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary.
>> >>
>> >> --------------------------------------
>> >> RFC9142 (draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-20)
>> >> --------------------------------------
>> >> Title               : Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and
>> Recommendations for Secure Shell (SSH)
>> >> Publication Date    : January 2022
>> >> Author(s)           : M. Baushke
>> >> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>> >> Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
>> >> Area                : Security
>> >> Stream              : IETF
>> >> Verifying Party     : IESG
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> Curdle mailing list
>> >> Curdle@ietf.org
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/curdle
>> >
>>
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>