Re: [Curdle] draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-00: a simplification proposal

On 22/07/16 21:08, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
<snip>
>>>> Using ASN.1 and RFC5912 modules:
>>>>
>>>> -- We need to contact Thawte Consulting, or Verisign, or whoever now
>>>> owns the 1.3.101 OID arc, as OID hijacking is not allowed.
>>>
>>> 1.3.101.100 was used in the IETF -00 draft. I think I heard it got
>>> allocated for EdDSA.
>>
>> I haven’t found an authoritative source for this.
>> It’s not the first time, 1.3.6 belongs to DoD, but 1.3.6.1 was « self-allocated » in RFC1065.
>
> Didn't find anything authoritative, but I did find that Simon
> switched to that OID (from much longer one) in persoal -02 draft.

Symantec own Thawte.  I persuaded Symantec to offer to reserve/delegate 
a range of OIDs under 1.3.101 for EdDSA (see [1]).  Simon accepted the 
offer and provisionally allocated some OIDs (see [2]).

After further discussion (private email exchange between Simon, myself 
and Rick Andrews) it was decided to start the OID range at 1.3.101.100. 
This was for two reasons:
   1) to avoid clashing with any OIDs that Thawte Consulting might have 
allocated many years ago.  For example, I found evidence that 
1.3.101.1.4 and 1.3.101.1.4.1 had been allocated previously.
   2) because the printable ASCII for the DER encoding of these OIDs is, 
frankly, irresistable (see [3]).  :-)

It's not clear from my records if Rick reserved/delegated 
1.3.101.100...1.3.101.115 or 1.3.101.100..1.3.101.127 for EdDSA.  It 
won't be hard to clarify that with Symantec though.

Please don't use any 1.3.101.x.y OIDs until we've run out of 1.3.101.x 
OIDs.  There's no point wasting bytes.

[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg16798.html

[2] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg16835.html

[3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg16586.html

>>>> id-EdXKeyAgreementAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
>>>> identified-organization(3) thawte(101) 102 }
>>>
>>> I don't know what 1.3.101.102 is…
>>
>> That’s why there’s a commentary saying it needs to be discussed.
>> sa-Ed* make use of the pk-Ed* keys.
>> There’s no defined use of pk-X* keys, and they’re used for key agreement.
>
> X.509 SPKI is used for more purposes than just X.509.
>
>> Since in the message I replied to, you proposed the following DER encoded sigalg:
>> 30 06 06 04 2B 65 64/65 01       Ed25519
>> It seemed you wanted to use 1.3.101.101 for signature algorithms, so I expanded to 1.3.101.102 for key agreement algorithms.
>> But again, it’s a subject of discussion.
>
> Back when I wrote that, I had missed that reuse is OK. And as I noted
> then one should use those 64 values.
>
>
>
> -Ilari
>
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