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Re: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8103 (5353)

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Thu, 10 May 2018 16:36 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
In-Reply-To: <20180510024450.2E353B80833@rfc-editor.org>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2018 12:36:17 -0400
Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, pleasestand@live.com, curdle <curdle@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [Curdle] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC8103 (5353)
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It probably make sense for this to be approved.  It has an impact on the P_MAX size.

Russ


> On May 9, 2018, at 10:44 PM, RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> wrote:
> 
> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC8103,
> "Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)".
> 
> --------------------------------------
> You may review the report below and at:
> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5353
> 
> --------------------------------------
> Type: Technical
> Reported by: Kevin Israel <pleasestand@live.com>
> 
> Section: 6
> 
> Original Text
> -------------
>   The amount of encrypted data possible in a single invocation of
>   AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is 2^32-1 blocks of 64 octets each, because of
>   the size of the block counter field in the ChaCha20 block function.
>   This gives a total of 247,877,906,880 octets, which is likely to be
>   sufficient to handle the size of any CMS content type.  Note that the
>   ciphertext length field in the authentication buffer will accommodate
>   2^64 octets, which is much larger than necessary.
> 
> Corrected Text
> --------------
>   The amount of encrypted data possible in a single invocation of
>   AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is 2^32-1 blocks of 64 octets each, because of
>   the size of the block counter field in the ChaCha20 block function.
>   This gives a total of 274,877,906,880 octets, which is likely to be
>   sufficient to handle the size of any CMS content type.  Note that the
>   ciphertext length field in the authentication buffer will accommodate
>   2^64 octets, which is much larger than necessary.
> 
> Notes
> -----
> The calculated total number of octets that can be encrypted in a single invocation is incorrect. See RFC Errata, Erratum ID 4858, RFC 7539.
> 
> Instructions:
> -------------
> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party  
> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
> 
> --------------------------------------
> RFC8103 (draft-ietf-curdle-cms-chacha20-poly1305-06)
> --------------------------------------
> Title               : Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
> Publication Date    : February 2017
> Author(s)           : R. Housley
> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
> Source              : CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption
> Area                : Security
> Stream              : IETF
> Verifying Party     : IESG
> 
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