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Re: [Dance] CRLs/OCSP and DANE at RIPE84

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 24 May 2022 13:12 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
cc: dance <dance@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 09:12:13 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Dance] CRLs/OCSP and DANE at RIPE84
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Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:
    >> https://ripe84.ripe.net/archives/video/864/
    >> Geoff Houston looks at Revocation, and who it is just not working, and
    >> suggests DNSSEC+DANE.
    >> Very much Worth watching.
    >>

    > I'm kind of sympathetic to Geoff's views.

    > But the prospects of DANE generally replacing (or constraining) PKIX and
    > delivering a DNS
    > based revocation capability seem pretty slim to me, especially in the web
    > arena, which seemed

I don't think that Geoff imagines any kind of revocation capability via DNS.

    > to be the focus of Geoff's presentation. Note the failed attempt to
    > standardize the TLS DNSSEC
    > chain extension in the TLS working group (now published as an experimental
    > RFC via the ISE).

I didn't follow that work, but that's basically part of the problem.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide

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