Re: [Dance] New Version Notification for draft-latour-dns-and-digital-trust-00.txt

Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca> Tue, 02 May 2023 17:29 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca>
To: Jacques Latour <Jacques.Latour@cira.ca>, "dance@ietf.org" <dance@ietf.org>
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Date: Tue, 02 May 2023 13:29:30 -0400
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Subject: Re: [Dance] New Version Notification for draft-latour-dns-and-digital-trust-00.txt
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I browsed your document, but I had difficulty understanding it's
applicability.  In my experience with Verified Credentials, they are just not
useable to individuals without the use of a smartphone.  Said smartphone has
no static IP address, so must use a mediator in order to go through
credential presentations, etc. Even if the smartphone did have a stable IPv6,
it probably doesn't have the battery power to be willing to be reachable at
all times.  To date, I haven't found a reasonable business model for
operation of the mediator service(s) which are critical to this entire model.

I mention this because I don't understand how/why your example in section 4.2
would be interacted with.  At first, I thought that I was going to interact
with it when I obtain a credential, but then I realized that was wrong.

If my university provides a credential attesting to my degree to me, I'm not
going to reach out to the university for this did; I think I already have it.

It would be the verifiers that might need this information.
But, when I do a credential presentation with some verifier, I would have
already provided them with the right links, or they would already have them.

I'm unclear how the privacy violating DNS lookup would help them with an
authorization decision.

Perhaps there is a better flow or example that could be used to explain this?
My observation from work in this area is that the "distributed ledgers" are
more of a liability than a feature, and that it would be a good thing if
"sovereign" entities could use the things they are already sovereign over,
namely their ccTLDs as anchors.

{I still think we did DNSSEC root wrong}

--
]               Never tell me the odds!                 | ipv6 mesh networks [
]   Michael Richardson, Sandelman Software Works        |    IoT architect   [
]     mcr@sandelman.ca  http://www.sandelman.ca/        |   ruby on rails    [