Re: [dane] Digest Algorithm Agility discussion

[Paul Hoffman <[e-mail]>]

On Mar 17, 2014, at 11:22 AM, Viktor Dukhovni <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 17, 2014 at 11:14:32AM -0700, Paul Hoffman wrote:
> 
>>> There is no text in 6698 that even approximately suggests that clients
>>> get to use only the records with the strongest (local criteria) digest.
>> 
>> In Section 4.1:
>>   o  A TLSA RRSet whose DNSSEC validation state is secure MUST be used
>>      as a certificate association for TLS unless a local policy would
>>      prohibit the use of the specific certificate association in the
>>      secure TLSA RRSet.
> 
> This is not "use strongest".  

Correct.

> This is the opposite.

Not correct. It allows local policy of any sort. Some local policies will be "do not use X because it is weak".

>  It forces the
> use of tarnished, but still acceptable digests even when untarnished
> digests are present.  

It does not because that choice is local policy.

> The new proposal is to ignore all but the
> strongest, even when the remainder would be usable.

That new proposal mandates a view of "strongest". Local policy should still trump that mandate.

> Also the pseudo-code in the appendices loops over *all* "usable" TLSA
> RRs (those not banned by 4.1).  

Correct. And RRs that are prohibited by local policy have already been removed:
   for each R in TLSArecords {
     // unusable records include unknown certUsage, unknown
     // selectorType, unknown matchingType, erroneous RDATA, and
     // prohibited by local policy
     if (R is unusable) {
       remove R from TLSArecords
     }
   }

> My proposal modifies the pseudo-code
> to loop over only those records (for each usage/selector) with the
> strongest digest plus any records with matching type 0.

Over-riding local policy is a non-starter, at least in my opinion.

Also: your focus on digests is possibly misplaced; why do you believe that a digest is more likely to be tarnished than a signature algorithm itself?

--Paul Hoffman