Re: [dane] DANE Testing
Stephen Nightingale <night@nist.gov> Fri, 21 February 2014 21:54 UTC
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Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2014 16:54:04 -0500
From: Stephen Nightingale <night@nist.gov>
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Subject: Re: [dane] DANE Testing
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On 2/21/2014 4:38 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote: > On Fri, Feb 21, 2014 at 03:19:10PM -0500, Stephen Nightingale wrote: > >> It is now possible to test from both TLSlite based and GnuTLS based >> clients. > The GnuTLS DANE implementation does not implement DANE-TA(2) or > correctly. It may also IIRC not do PKIX-TA(0) right either. The > issue is that the TA is incorrectly constrained to be the immediate > issuer of the leaf certificate. There may be other problems, I > did not perform a comprehensive code review. > > So results from GnuTLS DANE verification can be misleading. I should point out that I am not using GnuTLS idea of DANE verification. I'm getting the cert chain passed up and doing my own DANE verification. For this purpose I had to modify the python-gnutls-1.2.5 interface to GnuTLS, to pass in a certificate chain, since in the download it only passes in a single end cert. > >> A golden, canonical CA list would be nice to find. But I guess that its >> non-universal availability is one of the problems of the CA system >> that DANE is aiming squarely at. > There is no such beast. A form of Goedel's incompleteness theorem > applies: any list of CAs is either incomplete or untrustworthy (or > both). > >> The differences between TLSlite and GnuTLS clients highlight the >> fact that there are unresolved interoperability issues among TLS >> implementations. > Default configurations of GnuTLS typically enforce unreasonable > minimum sizes on EDH primes. Applications have to work around > these with policy overrides. > >> I look forward to seeing the newly upgraded OpenSSL >> client with added DANE. It is quite possible that as an interim step >> before its appearance I will add this DANE-in-the-App implementation >> to pyOpenSSL and/or Twisted. > Such a project should not be undertaken lightly, it is too easy to > get it wrong. > >> If you find any glaring errors, I will be embarrassed but thankful. >> If you find any subtle errors I will be impressed and thankful. > A code review is required to rule out subtle errors, glaring errors > may show up in tests if the test bed is sufficiently comprehensive. >
- [dane] DANE Testing Stephen Nightingale
- Re: [dane] DANE Testing Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] DANE Testing Stephen Nightingale
- Re: [dane] DANE Testing Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [dane] [Uta] DANE Testing Kurt Roeckx
- Re: [dane] [Uta] DANE Testing Viktor Dukhovni