IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [Dcrup] Progress Evaluating DCRUP

Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com> Mon, 26 February 2018 05:53 UTC

Return-Path: <sklist@kitterman.com>
X-Original-To: dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3AED5128C0A for <dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 25 Feb 2018 21:53:00 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.001
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=kitterman.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id uUjzs-4k3Z_d for <dcrup@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 25 Feb 2018 21:52:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mailout03.controlledmail.com (mailout03.controlledmail.com [208.43.65.50]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 85FB8126C0F for <dcrup@ietf.org>; Sun, 25 Feb 2018 21:52:58 -0800 (PST)
Received: from kitterma-e6430.localnet (static-72-81-252-22.bltmmd.fios.verizon.net [72.81.252.22]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mailout03.controlledmail.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5494CC401E9 for <dcrup@ietf.org>; Sun, 25 Feb 2018 23:52:57 -0600 (CST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=kitterman.com; s=201409; t=1519624377; bh=dFG17AsfRdrcUimGmaGRSqhCGfUunyiE/ptXXSux2hk=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ZY6w8RMmxOsXf9dq46FCoqmWl1ZMVPLFT8WMAugSPublaONL0CVG3YffG8+eFMqu4 LHuE7LqmHP7tNOlWDCOkOELJM9FEJozAEgkBV1qQl8wo/oa/i/zVsWzRS/aRYF3Erm Vn2SHtLRqoUe6/gArbqz82ngoHa68g2/zXjXxdoQ=
From: Scott Kitterman <sklist@kitterman.com>
To: dcrup@ietf.org
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 00:52:56 -0500
Message-ID: <4914167.fee8KLkeOb@kitterma-e6430>
User-Agent: KMail/4.13.3 (Linux/3.13.0-139-generic; KDE/4.13.3; x86_64; ; )
In-Reply-To: <5A9387F6.8060609@isdg.net>
References: <20180221003615.9BEBD1C2E8DA@ary.local> <AA2A508D-FE2A-451B-B06B-D8B85E7522E8@glyphein.mailforce.net> <5A9387F6.8060609@isdg.net>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dcrup/EJ6wnxMVLt5pYC9wWCvkFmNaSgU>
Subject: Re: [Dcrup] Progress Evaluating DCRUP
X-BeenThere: dcrup@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: DKIM Crypto Update <dcrup.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/dcrup>, <mailto:dcrup-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dcrup/>
List-Post: <mailto:dcrup@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:dcrup-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dcrup>, <mailto:dcrup-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 05:53:00 -0000

So you think that ed25529 only signing is a good strategy now?

Scott K

On Sunday, February 25, 2018 11:07:18 PM Hector Santos wrote:
> That includes the DROP author who is fully aware of RFC8301 and it
> "should" make a reference in order to relax the sha256 mandate imposed
> by RFC8301.
> 
> It can't ignorant of the STD76+RFC8301 update.
> 
> My opinion.
> 
> On 2/25/2018 10:17 PM, Stan Kalisch wrote:
> > On Feb 25, 2018, at 3:30 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy <superuser@gmail.com
> > 
> > <mailto:superuser@gmail.com>> wrote:
> >> On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 6:54 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com
> >> 
> >> <mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>> wrote:
> >>     >     DRUP will need to update STD76-RFC8301 again to allow signers
> >>     >     to use
> >>         
> >>         ed25519-sha256.
> >>     
> >>     Will we?  Our intent was to shut down after this last draft is
> >>     published.  Is there more to do?  Let's get that on the table,
> >>     if so.  Aleksey, your thoughts?
> >> 
> >> I don't think that's strictly necessary.
> > 
> > I don't think it is, either.  To play devil's advocate, the only thing
> > that I see that potentially facilitates mild confusion, in retrospect,
> > is where RFC 8301 reads, "Two algorithms are defined by this
> > specification at this time: rsa-sha1 and rsa-sha256."  This is, of
> > course, correct, but, in theory, in the not-too-distant future,
> > someone modifying an implementation could be up late one night and go,
> > "Oh.  It says 'January 2018' and 'at this time', so I'm good," without
> > checking to see if anything else updates 6376.
> > 
> > This, however, doesn't change the fact that you're supposed to check
> > each RFC to see if something else updates it.  Which is why I don't
> > buy Hector's argument.
> > 
> > 
> > Stan
> > 
> >> As I recall, 8301 updated 6376 to specifically deprecate a practice
> >> the community believes is insecure.  Adding a new algorithm is a
> >> step in the opposite direction, so I think adding ed25519 as a key
> >> type just requires IANA actions and the appropriate documentation,
> >> which I believe is what our remaining document already does.
> >> 
> >> What am I missing?
> >> 
> >> -MSK
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Dcrup mailing list
> >> Dcrup@ietf.org <mailto:Dcrup@ietf.org>
> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dcrup
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > Dcrup mailing list
> > Dcrup@ietf.org
> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dcrup

v2.46.0 | Report a Bug | By Email | System Status