Re: [dhcwg] Security for leasequery messages

Kim Kinnear <kkinnear@cisco.com> Fri, 09 April 2004 00:04 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2004 16:38:19 -0400
To: Ralph Droms <rdroms@cisco.com>, dhcwg@ietf.org
From: Kim Kinnear <kkinnear@cisco.com>
Subject: Re: [dhcwg] Security for leasequery messages
Cc: kkinnear@cisco.com
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Folks,

This is clearly an issue, and there are no easy answers.
Here is one approach:

Nothing is mandatory to implement, since one approach is to
ensure that there is physical security between the access
concentrator and the DHCP server.

A better approach is to use some form of the not-yet-fully-baked
relay agent authentication.  For example:

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dhc-auth-suboption-03.txt

but since this is still coming along, it can't be mandatory,
that's for sure.  We could wait to standardize leasequery until
something was approved for relay agent authentication, but that
will further delay something that has already undergone numerous
delays.  There are large number of similar-to-the-standard
leasequery installations, and more every day.  It would be nice
to bring them all into compliance over time, and time is
getting away from us.

One approach would be to make something mandatory once that
something exists, which is a little odd but perhaps doable.  We
might be able to say:

        "When some form of relay-agent to DHCP server
        authentication becomes a standard, its use for leasequery
        becomes mandatory."

Something to consider.

Any other ideas for handle this one?

Cheers -- Kim

At 07:56 PM 4/6/2004, Ralph Droms wrote:
>The following issues relate to security for leasequery messages:
>
>Steve Bellovin:
>
>Discuss:
>(26 March 2004)
>The Security Considerations section says this:
>
>   DHCP servers SHOULD prevent exposure of location information
>   (particularly the mapping of hardware address to IP address lease,
>   which can be an invasion of broadband subscriber privacy) by
>   employing some form of relay agent authentication between the
>   DHCPLEASEQUERY client and the DHCP server.
>
>   Clients of the DHCPLEASEQUERY message SHOULD ensure that their data
>   path to the DHCP server is secure.  Clients SHOULD use Relay Agent
>   Information security as a way to achieve this goal.
>
>What is "some form of ... authentication"?  What is "Relay Agent Information
>security"?  Put another way, what is mandatory to implement?
>
>Russ Housley:
>
>Discuss:
>  Section 7 says:
>  >
>  > DHCP servers SHOULD prevent exposure of location information
>  > (particularly the mapping of hardware address to IP address lease,
>  > which can be an invasion of broadband subscriber privacy) by
>  > employing some form of relay agent authentication between the
>  > DHCPLEASEQUERY client and the DHCP server.
>  >
>  There needs to be more discussion of the authentication requirements.
>  I would prefer the specification to name a mandatory-to-implement
>  mechanism, but that may be asking too much.
>
>  Section 7 also says:
>  >
>  > Clients of the DHCPLEASEQUERY message SHOULD ensure that their data
>  > path to the DHCP server is secure.
>  >
>  What security services are needed?  Integrity, authentication, access
>  control, replay protection confidentiality?  The hint about Relay Agent
>  Information security, with no reference, is not sufficient.
>
>
>
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