Re: [dhcwg] missing pieces for the Secure DHCPv6 draft

Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr> Sat, 31 October 2015 01:05 UTC

Message-Id: <201510310102.t9V12gEL036127@givry.fdupont.fr>
From: Francis Dupont <Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr>
To: 神明達哉 <jinmei@wide.ad.jp>
In-reply-to: Your message of Wed, 28 Oct 2015 16:57:08 -0700. <CAJE_bqfU__kQMXWq8cdc8ppQg3qzTkKbywnQdHDTrqhZhp_Geg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 31 Oct 2015 02:02:42 +0100
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dhcwg/ShUqO--l9FmaVM61SxvY655RuIk>
Cc: "dhcwg@ietf.org" <dhcwg@ietf.org>, charliekaufman@outlook.com
Subject: Re: [dhcwg] missing pieces for the Secure DHCPv6 draft
Precedence: list

 In your previous mail you wrote:

>  Key distribution: whether it's shared secret based or public key
>  based, key distribution is a big issue.  dhc-v4-threat-analysis shows
>  some possibilities in its Section 6.3, such as using a security token
>  device or with help of other protocols like EAP or RADIUS (Francis's
>  hint of using SEND would also be one such approach).

=> note that SEND is used (please don't confuse visible with ostensible :-)
and it solves all the gory PKI details (same than for "everything pre
configured" but with an already deployed base. Unfortunately I don't
know public documents about SEND deployments/recommendations (I am
afraid they are "restricted not Internet" :-).

>  For the purpose of the sedhcpv6 draft, if usability issues of TOFU
>  still continues to be blocking, I think we can simply remove it from
>  the draft as an alternative.

=> perhaps the solution is to move all deployment/applicability stuff
from the secure DHCPv6 "mechanisms" I-D so it can be published as soon
as the threat model is complete?

Thanks

Francis.Dupont@fdupont.fr

[dhcwg] missing pieces for the Secure DHCPv6 draft 神明達哉
Re: [dhcwg] missing pieces for the Secure DHCPv6 … 神明達哉
Re: [dhcwg] missing pieces for the Secure DHCPv6 … Francis Dupont
Re: [dhcwg] missing pieces for the Secure DHCPv6 … 神明達哉