Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP
Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl> Tue, 18 October 2022 16:59 UTC
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Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 16:59:43 +0000
From: Rick van Rein <rick@openfortress.nl>
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Subject: Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP
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Hi Eric, > The general assumption has been that any end-to-end authentication > will be done by digitally signing the SIP messages. Probably the most > plausible at the moment is to base it on STIR/Passport. It's not > clear to me why SASL would help here. STIF/PASSporT only handles phone numbers. Certificate signing could also be used, but for crossover between hitherto unknown domains that pretty much requires (for maximum leniency on the client account side) a Client DANE registration for a domain CA, or a TTP that signs every users and each and every alias they might think of. -Rick
- [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Rick van Rein
- Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Rick van Rein
- Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Rick van Rein
- Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Rick van Rein
- Re: [dispatch] SASL Authentication for SIP Eric Rescorla