[dispatch] New Draft: DNS-based out-of-band integrity verification (DIVE) for HTTP resources
Matéo Callec <mateo@callec.net> Mon, 21 September 2026 18:00 UTC
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Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2026 20:00:01 +0200
From: Matéo Callec <mateo@callec.net>
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Subject: [dispatch] New Draft: DNS-based out-of-band integrity verification (DIVE) for HTTP resources
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Hi all, I'd like to bring an updated draft to DISPATCH and get your guidance on next steps. This work was previously discussed in SECDISPATCH and on DNSOP. Domain-based Integrity Verification Enforcement (DIVE) is a mechanism for verifying the integrity and authenticity of static HTTP artifacts (firmware images, packages, versioned binaries) by publishing signing keys as DNSSEC-protected DNS records. The target use case is non-browser, automated clients (update agents, package managers, IoT fleets) where offline-signed content and DNS-based key revocation can replace a CA-based code-signing setup. Draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-callec-dive/ Previous SECDISPATCH thread: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdispatch/zLaSbwVyMLvpMU5B0dwjXEPA9-Q/ IETF 126 HotRFC slides: https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-hotrfc-sessa-dive-a-dns-based-alternative-to-ca-based-code-signing-for-http-artifacts-00 Version -02 addresses the feedback received on the earlier versions. Given the narrow, specific-use-case scope of this work, I'd appreciate the group's view on whether this fits an existing WG, would be better handled as an AD-sponsored individual submission, or needs something else. Thanks, Matéo
- [dispatch] New Draft: DNS-based out-of-band integ… Matéo Callec
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- [dispatch] Re: New Draft: DNS-based out-of-band i… Matéo Callec
- [dispatch] Re: New Draft: DNS-based out-of-band i… Eric Rescorla