Re: [dix] Agenda bashing

Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com> Mon, 03 July 2006 20:41 UTC

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To: Digital Identity Exchange <dix@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [dix] Agenda bashing
References: <20060703172550.A182A222425@laser.networkresonance.com> <44A973DC.9040801@cisco.com>
From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@networkresonance.com>
Date: Mon, 03 Jul 2006 13:41:29 -0700
In-Reply-To: <44A973DC.9040801@cisco.com> (Eliot Lear's message of "Mon, 03 Jul 2006 21:45:32 +0200")
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Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> writes:

> Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> That's *one* way to attack phishing (at least the current form).
>> There are others (cf. PwdHash)
>>   
>
> I'm sorry, but PwdHash is not enough of a reference for me to
> understand,

http://crypto.stanford.edu/PwdHash/

It's the first hit in Google, FWIW.


> but I claim that the most *effective* way to prevent
> phishing is to demand that the server prove its identity enough to know
> the right question to ask of the client.  If PwdHash covers this ground,
> then we agree.

It doesn't. It uses an entirely different technique.

I don't think it's profitable to argue about what "most effective"
is, but I don't agree that the mechanism you describe is the only
one.

-Ekr



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