Re: [dmarc-ietf] Issue submission - Mailing list security and potential solutions using DMARC

Joseph Brennan <brennan@columbia.edu> Wed, 16 September 2020 15:03 UTC

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From: Joseph Brennan <brennan@columbia.edu>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2020 11:03:15 -0400
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To: IETF DMARC WG <dmarc@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] Issue submission - Mailing list security and potential solutions using DMARC
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What I mean is that mailing list software developers were obliged to
find a variety of ways to evade dmarc enforcement, for the sake of
delivering legitimate mail, and mailbox server developers learned to
allow mangled mail for the same reason. Widespread acceptance of email
that evades an authentication method diminishes its effectiveness.



On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 10:46 AM Dotzero <dotzero@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 12:02 PM Joseph Brennan <brennan@columbia.edu> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 11:55 AM John Levine <johnl@taugh.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> In article <CAMSGcLDKRMbJ_30jZdKE_6hkKaktwBxU6_E=E=bnK2_CKMNEXw@mail.gmail.com>,
>>> Joseph Brennan  <brennan@columbia.edu> wrote:
>>> >"Domain administrators must not apply dmarc authentication to domains
>>> >from which end users send mail that may be re-sent via lists or
>>> >automatic forwarding."  -- done. Then dmarc will be simple and
>>> >reliable, and bank statements and similar messages are protected as
>>> >intended. Building in a standard workaround significantly weakens the
>>> >whole concept, doesn't it?
>>>
>>> Unfortunately, we have ample evidence that domain operators will
>>> ignore that advice.
>>>
>>> According to someone who was in the room when Yahoo flipped the
>>> switch, the person in charge said words to the effect that I know this
>>> will screw up everyone's mailing lists and I don't care.
>>>
>>
>> The irony is, the result being to diminish the effectiveness of dmarc for everybody.
>>
>>
>> Joseph Brennan
>> Lead, Email and Systems Applications
>> Columbia University Information Technology
>>
>>
>
> Can you support your assertion with data? There was zero change post-yahoo/AOL implementation vs pre-yahoo/AOL implementation for the organization I worked for at the time.
>
> Michael Hammer



-- 
Joseph Brennan
Lead, Email and Systems Applications
Columbia University Information Technology