Re: [dmarc-ietf] AND vs. OR (was Re: wiki vs. list?)

Brett McDowell <brettmcdowell@gmail.com> Mon, 27 October 2014 20:55 UTC

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From: Brett McDowell <brettmcdowell@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:55:25 -0400
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References: <CABuGu1qDAaF0es0ikVk2KbgQaPTFeybKDu-hP=jY17txSuJxaw@mail.gmail.com> <544A41D4.2000206@isdg.net> <544A60AB.3020308@meetinghouse.net> <CABDkrv0jiDuLCVNzH5bfwYp3inn-wcRz+mPogPoRuxz0sYTU5Q@mail.gmail.com> <EED02883-386B-403E-80A5-73C17C2E45E3@gmail.com>
To: Douglas Otis <doug.mtview@gmail.com>
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Cc: dmarc <dmarc@ietf.org>, Mike Jones <mjones@mail.agari.com>
Subject: Re: [dmarc-ietf] AND vs. OR (was Re: wiki vs. list?)
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Doug, you missed (at least) one option which I will characterize as “transient trust”.  I suggest transient trust could be implemented at scale (for many use cases) via something like OAR [1] and a companion BCP.

-Brett

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kucherawy-original-authres-00 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kucherawy-original-authres-00>



> On Oct 27, 2014, at 2:56 PM, Douglas Otis <doug.mtview@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Oct 27, 2014, at 10:30 AM, Mike Jones <mjones@mail.agari.com <mailto:mjones@mail.agari.com>> wrote:
> 
>> On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:22 AM, Miles Fidelman <mfidelman@meetinghouse.net <mailto:mfidelman@meetinghouse.net>> wrote:
>> Hector Santos wrote:
>> Hi Kurt,
>> 
>> If we are going to be picky about logic, then lets consider the symbolic correctness with short circuiting optimization, and it would be:
>> 
>>    DMARC = SPF or DKIM
>> 
>> <snip>
>> 
>> Am I missing something here?  As I understand it, DMARC is MORE than SPF and DKIM.  Specifically, as I understand it,  sender field alignment, that's bit all of us who run mailing lists, is specific to DMARC.
>> 
>> You're not missing anything.  
>> 
>> aligned SPF pass OR aligned DKIM pass = DMARC pass
> 
> Dear Mike,
> 
> Agreed.  To further clarify the obvious, the WG needs to deal with large ISPs asserting DMARC p=reject against normal user accounts where, for legitimate messages, the From header field offered by various third-party services can not be aligned with either SPF or DKIM.
> 
> Possible mitigations: 
> 
> 1) Develop a scheme for the DMARC domain to assert domain specific policy exceptions in the case of legitimate third-party services.
> 
> 2) Create a group syntax able to bypass DMARC p= policy assertions by offering visual indications in the From header field that an exception may have been made.
> 
> 3) Munge the domain of the From header field and expect users to hand edit addresses.
> 
> 4) Adopt a new generic method (not list specific) conditionally replacing the role of the From header field with a new (invisible) header field.
> 
> IMHO, options 3 and 4 should be avoided. 
> 
> Regards,
> Douglas Otis
> 
> 
> 
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