Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model
"Ralf Weber" <dns@fl1ger.de> Wed, 06 November 2019 09:24 UTC
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From: Ralf Weber <dns@fl1ger.de>
To: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, dns-privacy@ietf.org
Date: Wed, 06 Nov 2019 10:24:06 +0100
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model
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Moin! On 6 Nov 2019, at 0:13, Warren Kumari wrote: > I'd like some system where I can signal that I support DoT: > 1: without my parent having to do anything (like be upgraded to > support DoT) Why does the parent to be upgraded to DoT? It can just indicate a DoT server for a child. These are normal DNS semantics. > 2: without having people to probe and wait for a timeout Again resolution follows the delegation, so that is the best place to put this in. > 3: with my users first connection protected, so they don't have to > lookup safe.kumari.net (to make sure that the resolver knows that > ns01.kumari.net supports DoT), or something like _dot.kumari.net > before looking up secret.kumari.net. Well as long as you are ok with that someone wants to something in kumari.net that should work. However maybe it is good to remind people that public DNS data is public so keeping something secret is hard to impossible. Also there has been some research presented at the ANRW workshop that even when hiding all DNS traffic from an observer it still is possible to digest what user visited by only looking at the IP addresses. ( https://irtf.org/anrw/2019/program.html - What Can You Learn from an IP). As said before if we really want privacy for users we have to fully encrypt and obfuscate layer 3. > 4: without expecting everyone to support DNSSEC. Really. I can not see how we design something new that does not take DNSSEC into account. That would negate a lot of hard work done by a lot of people over decades. Would you design something new without taking IPv6 into account? So long -Ralf —-- Ralf Weber
- [dns-privacy] Threat Model Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dns-privacy] Threat Model Christian Huitema
- Re: [dns-privacy] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] Threat Model Ted Hardie
- Re: [dns-privacy] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Hoffman
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Hoffman
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Stephen Farrell
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dns-privacy] what's good enough, or Threat M… John Levine
- Re: [dns-privacy] what's good enough, or Threat M… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Warren Kumari
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dns-privacy] what's good enough, or Threat M… John R Levine
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Warren Kumari
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model David Conrad
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Stephen Farrell
- Re: [dns-privacy] Threat Model Livingood, Jason
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Tony Finch
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Eric Rescorla
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model John Levine
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model John Levine
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Tony Finch
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Warren Kumari
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Warren Kumari
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Warren Kumari
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Dan Wing
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Mark Andrews
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Ralf Weber
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Hugo Connery
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Stephen Farrell
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Hoffman
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Ted Hardie
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Bob Harold
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Stephen Farrell
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Brian Dickson
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Ebersman
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Paul Wouters
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model Bob Harold
- Re: [dns-privacy] [Ext] Threat Model sthaug