[dns-privacy] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing-12: (with COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing-12: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Thank you to Rich Salz for the SECDIR review.

I support Paul’s DISCUSS positions.

** Section 4.6.3.4
   Because this probing policy is unilateral and opportunistic, the
   client connecting under this policy MUST accept any certificate
   presented by the server.  If the client cannot verify the server's
   identity, it MAY use that information for reporting, logging, or
   other analysis purposes.  But it MUST NOT reject the connection due
   to the authentication failure, as the result would be falling back to
   cleartext, which would leak the content of the session to a passive
   network monitor.

What verification is expected? When might it trigger “reporting, logging or
other analysis”?  I ask because the text seems to unambiguously say all server
certificates must be accepted and then again that no connections can be
rejected.