[dns-privacy] Restarting the discussion of draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org> Tue, 12 July 2022 18:46 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@icann.org>
To: DNS Privacy Working Group <dns-privacy@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Restarting the discussion of draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing
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Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 18:46:34 +0000
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Subject: [dns-privacy] Restarting the discussion of draft-ietf-dprive-unilateral-probing
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Greetings again, and thank you to everyone who contributed comments on the -00 draft. As you can see, we published the -01 draft yesterday, and would love to get some discussion happening on the list to help focus the discussion at IETF 114. (I say "we" because dkg and Joey were kind enough to add me as a co-author!)

As you can see from the diffs, there are a lot of changes in -01. The most significant technical change is the addition of a new field, E-last-response, the timestamp of the most recent response received on an established connection. This makes the checks for persistence more accurate. 

There are still some issues to be resolved in the draft; they are marked with "FIXME". In specific:

- Should Extended DNS Errors (EDEs) be passed on to clients that have requested them? Is this different between encrypted and unencrypted transport?

- Should resumption tickets be used when encrypted transport fails?

- Should we further refine (past what is already in the document) what to do when encrypted transport fails? A few examples are given.

We also have a few open issues tracked in our GitLab repo at <https://gitlab.com/dkg/dprive-unilateral-probing/-/issues>.

Please review any/all of the above, and if you have a comment, please open a new thread here on the mailing list. We can also take new issues here or in the tracker, and we know that all issues should be resolved here on the list.

DPRIVE has a short meeting at IETF 114 (we're in a slot with the ADD WG, and they have three draft that about to go to IESG ballot), but it would be great if we can spend it working on issues instead of the typical slideware presentation just listing the issues.

--Paul Hoffman