[dns-privacy] draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements: The User Perspective and Use Cases

["Hollenbeck, Scott" <[e-mail]>]

Section 9.1 of draft-ietf-dprive-phase2-requirements currently contains this text:

"As recursors typically forwards queries received from the user to authoritative servers.  This creates a transitive trust between the user and the recursor, as well as the authoritative server, since information created by the user is exposed to the authoritative server.  However, the user never has a chance to identify what data was exposed to which authoritative party (via which path).

Also, Users would want to be informed about the status of the connections which were made on their behalf, which adds a fourth point

Encryption/privacy status signaling

*TODO*: Actual requirements - what do users "want"?  Start below:"

I'm not sure there's much to be added here since users currently have no ability to pick and choose services that a recursive resolver negotiates with an authoritative name server. The user can pick a recursive resolver based on the set of services it provides, and that's about it. I'd like to suggest that we replace the above text with something like the following:

"Recursive resolvers typically act as intermediaries.  They forward queries received from users to authoritative servers without any configurable and/or measurable interaction between the user and the authoritative name servers. As when making requests through other intermediaries, users do not necessarily have the ability to identify information that is disclosed by the intermediary to other service provider, i.e., an authoritative server in this case. As such,
users should simply choose a recursor that provides a set of services that best meets the user's need for information protection, along with other considerations."

Scott