Re: [dns-privacy] Core effort

Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr> Mon, 24 March 2014 11:21 UTC

Date: Mon, 24 Mar 2014 12:21:05 +0100
From: Stephane Bortzmeyer <bortzmeyer@nic.fr>
To: Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20140324112105.GB24967@nic.fr>
References: <CA+9kkMBBeGVq12ON+RR1ttRf7FX6LyxXVuv-X2SPGpEbiut2Zw@mail.gmail.com>
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Cc: dns-privacy@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] Core effort
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On Fri, Mar 21, 2014 at 03:51:30PM -0700,
 Ted Hardie <ted.ietf@gmail.com> wrote 
 a message of 58 lines which said:

> We may eventually get to active attacks as well, but those aren't likely to
> be occurring at the moment because they aren't required; passive monitoring
> of a cleartext protocol is enough.
> 
> Do we have agreement that this is the core of what we're setting out to do?

Not for me. The problem is that "active" or "passive" depends on the
layer. According to Snowden files, the NSA is doing _active_ attacks
(injecting packets with QUANTUM, planting malware with FOXACID) for
the purpose of conducting _passive_ data collection.

So, I do not think we should limit ourselves to passive attacks. I
like the idea (in draft-hallambaker-dnse) to have several levels of
security (against a purely passive attacker, against an active
attacker but with a trusted first contact, against an active attacker
in every case, etc).

[dns-privacy] Core effort Ted Hardie
Re: [dns-privacy] Core effort Stephen Farrell
Re: [dns-privacy] Core effort Phillip Hallam-Baker
Re: [dns-privacy] Core effort Stephane Bortzmeyer
Re: [dns-privacy] Core effort Petr Spacek
Re: [dns-privacy] Core effort Phillip Hallam-Baker