Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt

"A. Schulze" <sca@andreasschulze.de> Mon, 11 March 2019 19:12 UTC

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From: "A. Schulze" <sca@andreasschulze.de>
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Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 20:12:41 +0100
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Subject: Re: [dns-privacy] New Version Notification for draft-bretelle-dprive-dot-spki-in-ns-name-00.txt
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Am 11.03.19 um 17:20 schrieb manu tman:
> I have captured in a draft the mechanism I used during IETF 103 hackathon and which is available aan experimental module in knot-resolver[0].
>  I was taken short with time before cit-off date, but I hope this will better explain how it works.

Hello,

for many years I run a dnscurve proxy [1] infront of my nameservers.
Worked perfect but virtually nobody used the encryption feature.
So, the draft *is* interesting to me...

two points comes to my mind while reading the draft:

1.
key rotation is hard.

2.
what's the reason for "In opportunistic mode, the resolver MUST use the authoritative name server despite the failure." ?
A server operator can't distinguish between a resolver in strict mode an a resolver in opportunistic mode TOGETHER with a failure (on server side?)
An other option is to force any resolver supporting "dot-" names to fall back on port 53.

Andreas

[1] http://curvedns.on2it.net/