Re: [dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5155 (4622)

["Blacka, David" <[e-mail]>]

> On Feb 19, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Brian Haberman <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Does anyone have an opinion on the validity of this erratum? It seems
> like a reasonable clarification in my reading.

The clarification looks correct and reasonable to me.

> 
> Brian
> 
> On 2/17/16 8:36 PM, RFC Errata System wrote:
>> The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5155,
>> "DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence".
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> You may review the report below and at:
>> http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=5155&eid=4622
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> Type: Technical
>> Reported by: Robert Edmonds <[e-mail]>
>> 
>> Section: 7.2.8
>> 
>> Original Text
>> -------------
>> 7.2.8.  Responding to Queries for NSEC3 Owner Names
>> 
>>   The owner names of NSEC3 RRs are not represented in the NSEC3 RR
>>   chain like other owner names.  As a result, each NSEC3 owner name is
>>   covered by another NSEC3 RR, effectively negating the existence of
>>   the NSEC3 RR.  This is a paradox, since the existence of an NSEC3 RR
>>   can be proven by its RRSIG RRSet.
>> 
>>   If the following conditions are all true:
>> 
>>   o  the QNAME equals the owner name of an existing NSEC3 RR, and
>> 
>>   o  no RR types exist at the QNAME, nor at any descendant of QNAME,
>> 
>>   then the response MUST be constructed as a Name Error response
>>   (Section 7.2.2).  Or, in other words, the authoritative name server
>>   will act as if the owner name of the NSEC3 RR did not exist.
>> 
>> 
>> Corrected Text
>> --------------
>> 7.2.8.  Responding to Queries for NSEC3 Owner Names
>> 
>>   The owner names of NSEC3 RRs are not represented in the NSEC3 RR
>>   chain like other owner names.  As a result, each NSEC3 owner name is
>>   covered by another NSEC3 RR, effectively negating the existence of
>>   the NSEC3 RR.  This is a paradox, since the existence of an NSEC3 RR
>>   can be proven by its RRSIG RRSet.
>> 
>>   If the following conditions are all true:
>> 
>>   o  the QNAME equals the owner name of an existing NSEC3 RR, and
>> 
>>   o  no RR types exist at the QNAME besides NSEC3, nor at any
>>      descendant of QNAME,
>> 
>>   then the response MUST be constructed as a Name Error response
>>   (Section 7.2.2).  Or, in other words, the authoritative name server
>>   will act as if the owner name of the NSEC3 RR did not exist.
>> 
>> 
>> Notes
>> -----
>> If the QNAME is equal to the owner name of an existing NSEC3 RR, then the NSEC3 RR type itself will exist at the QNAME, and the second condition will always be false.
>> 
>> Instructions:
>> -------------
>> This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please
>> use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or
>> rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party (IESG)
>> can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. 
>> 
>> --------------------------------------
>> RFC5155 (draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-13)
>> --------------------------------------
>> Title               : DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence
>> Publication Date    : March 2008
>> Author(s)           : B. Laurie, G. Sisson, R. Arends, D. Blacka
>> Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
>> Source              : DNS Extensions
>> Area                : Internet
>> Stream              : IETF
>> Verifying Party     : IESG
>> 
> 

--
David Blacka                          <[e-mail]> 
Distinguished Engineer                Verisign Product Engineering