[dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5702 (7090)
RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Mon, 15 August 2022 13:12 UTC
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Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 06:12:38 -0700
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Subject: [dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5702 (7090)
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The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5702, "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC". -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid7090 -------------------------------------- Type: Technical Reported by: Peter van Dijk <peter.van.dijk@powerdns.com> Section: 8.2 Original Text ------------- 8.2. Signature Type Downgrade Attacks Since each RRSet MUST be signed with each algorithm present in the DNSKEY RRSet at the zone apex (see Section 2.2 of [RFC4035]), a malicious party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG and force the validator to use the RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the zone. This should provide resilience against algorithm downgrade attacks, if the validator supports RSA/SHA-2. Corrected Text -------------- [none] Notes ----- The section is incorrect in its entirety. Although the requirement on signers does exist, there is no related requirement for validators to check that all signature algorithms are present. RFC6840 5.11 (which I do realise is newer than RFC5702) re-states this explicitly, where RFC4035 merely implied this distinction. Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC5702 (draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-14) -------------------------------------- Title : Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC Publication Date : October 2009 Author(s) : J. Jansen Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : DNS Extensions Area : Internet Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG
- [dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5702 (709… RFC Errata System
- Re: [dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5702 … Warren Kumari
- Re: [dnsext] [Technical Errata Reported] RFC5702 … Vladimír Čunát