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Re: [dnsext] Draft: RRTYPE B - Web Resource Integrity

Robert Edmonds <edmonds@mycre.ws> Fri, 17 November 2023 06:54 UTC

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Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2023 01:54:26 -0500
From: Robert Edmonds <edmonds@mycre.ws>
To: James Addison <james@reciperadar.com>
Cc: Niall O'Reilly <niall.oreilly@ucd.ie>, dnsext@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [dnsext] Draft: RRTYPE B - Web Resource Integrity
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James Addison wrote:
> Thank you Niall - yes, from a read of RFC 9460, it does seem like a
> SvcParamKey could be a good way to handle this use case, that's
> helpful.  I've taken a look at the IANA registry of existing service
> bindings[1] to confirm that no such binding has been added so far.
> 
> Note: there is one potential conflict from this use case that I'm
> aware of -- this use case is intended to cover both plaintext HTTP and
> encrypted HTTPS web requests.  Section 9.5 of RFC 9460 as I interpret
> it so far seems to require that the client upgrade to TLS/HTTPS for
> web requests.

I guess if you wanted to use the HTTPS RR with plaintext HTTP origins
you could define a new SvcParamKey (e.g. "no-default-hsts") that
indicates that the client should skip the HSTS-style upgrade in Section
9.5 of RFC 9460 and list that new SvcParamKey as a mandatory key when
publishing an HTTPS RR that uses it.

-- 
Robert Edmonds

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