Re: [dnsext] Report from chairs

[Federico Lucifredi <[e-mail]>]

I disagree. The shelving of TSIG/MD5 makes sense on its own (albeit just
on stack certification grounds - we understand that MD5 is not
compromised in this use).

There are no transitions: providers who care about ("no MD5"
certifications will just be able to drop the support for this algorithm
and claim both compliance with certification and with RFC standard.

That is a simple, self-contained issue.

DNScurve, which I am not a detractor to, will be mired in the usual SEC
feuding for a time, regardless of outcome. Whichever side you may take
on it, you know that is inevitably going to be the case.

So, if a consensus can be reached on closing the smaller TSIG/MD5 issue
per draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-md5, I would support that. And if the
original author is too busy to pursue it, I am willing to be the
"process monkey" who gets it done.

Could the chairs indicate what would be the next step for this draft.

Best -Federico

Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> My feeling is that we should shelve this and instead work on a key
> exchange to compliment TSIG and then deprecate HMAC-MD5 for use in
> that context.
> 
> The reason for this is that I think DNS-CURVE meets a real need, even
> if the approach is not really sensitive to existing DNS code.
> Suggesting a move to ECC is a good idea, suggesting transport layer
> security is a good idea. Suggesting both in the same proposal is not.
> 
> For example, most enterprises use split DNS. They do not want their
> internal DNS to be externally visible. But if (like me) the only
> corporate facility you really need most of the time is email, you can
> get perfectly adequate support by using SMTP and IMAP/POP over SSL.
> Using IPSEC just to secure the DNS part is really quite painful. This
> approach is much cleaner.
> 
> 
> So given that we can expect to upgrade the whole TSIG area in an
> important way, and given that there is no immediate security risk with
> MD5, I think it makes sense to have one transition rather than two.
> 
> 
> On Mon, Jul 26, 2010 at 3:10 AM, Francis Dupont
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>  In your previous mail you wrote:
>>
>>   4.  EXPIRED DRAFTS
>>
>>       - draft-ietf-dnsext-tsig-md5-deprecated
>>
>>   Is anyone still interested in this draft?  We have no movement on it.
>>
>> => there is a clear lack of support for this draft. I propose to give
>> the question to the security area so they should say if it is fine to
>> keep MD5 mandatory in an IETF protocol.
>>
>> Two comments:
>>  - MD5 is used in a way (HMAC) it is not proved to be weak
>>
>>  - the issue is MD5 it is forbidden for most (i.e., all I know of :-)
>>  certified cryptos so it is not possible to run a both certified (for
>>  the crypto) and conformant (to standards) TSIG tool.
>>  Now it seems to be only a formal concern...
>>
>> Thanks
>>
>> [e-mail]
>>
>>
> 
> 
> 


-- 

_________________________________________
-- "'Problem' is a bleak word for challenge" - Richard Fish
(Federico L. Lucifredi) - [e-mail]