Publication request raft-ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-timers-05
"Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@NLnetLabs.nl> Thu, 21 December 2006 16:10 UTC
Received: from [10.91.34.44] (helo=ietf-mx.ietf.org) by megatron.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GxQUd-0007mk-JZ; Thu, 21 Dec 2006 11:10:03 -0500
Received: from psg.com ([147.28.0.62]) by ietf-mx.ietf.org with esmtp (Exim 4.43) id 1GxQUb-0005Hx-2N; Thu, 21 Dec 2006 11:10:03 -0500
Received: from majordom by psg.com with local (Exim 4.63 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>) id 1GxQJW-000N9S-OH for namedroppers-data@psg.com; Thu, 21 Dec 2006 15:58:34 +0000
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.1.7 (2006-10-05) on psg.com
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.5 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00 autolearn=ham version=3.1.7
Received: from [213.154.224.1] (helo=open.nlnetlabs.nl) by psg.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.63 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <olaf@NLnetLabs.nl>) id 1GxQJL-000N8b-V6 for namedroppers@ops.ietf.org; Thu, 21 Dec 2006 15:58:29 +0000
Received: from [127.0.0.1] (open.nlnetlabs.nl [IPv6:2001:7b8:206:1::53]) by open.nlnetlabs.nl (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id kBLFvjdS084187; Thu, 21 Dec 2006 16:57:53 +0100 (CET) (envelope-from olaf@NLnetLabs.nl)
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v752.2)
Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; micalg="pgp-sha1"; boundary="Apple-Mail-37--569097658"
Message-Id: <6BFBBA38-9313-4BB2-AED1-34FA435AB7AE@NLnetLabs.nl>
Cc: IETF DNSEXT WG <namedroppers@ops.ietf.org>, dnsext-ads@tools.ietf.org, Mike StJohns <Mike.StJohns@nominum.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: "Olaf M. Kolkman" <olaf@NLnetLabs.nl>
Subject: Publication request raft-ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-timers-05
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2006 16:57:42 +0100
To: iesg-secretary@ietf.org
X-Pgp-Agent: GPGMail 1.1.2 (Tiger)
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.752.2)
Sender: owner-namedroppers@ops.ietf.org
Precedence: bulk
X-Spam-Score: 0.0 (/)
X-Scan-Signature: 850245b51c39701e2700a112f3032caa
Title : Requirements related to DNSSEC Trust Anchor Rollover Author(s) : M. StJohns Filename : draft-ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-timers-05 Date : November 29, 2006 Document shepherd: Olaf Kolkman This is a request to publish the document on the standards track This draft relates to draft-ietf-dnsext-rollover-requirements and we think these two documents should be treated together. 1) Have the chairs personally reviewed this version of the ID and do they believe this ID is sufficiently baked to forward to the IESG for publication? There are no nits according to idnits 1.108 (via tools.ietf.org). One could argue that DNSSEC terminology should have been expanded at first use, the chairs thinks this is not needed. 2) Has the document had adequate review from both key WG members and key non-WG members? Do you have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? Yes during last-call this document has been reviewed in depth by (at least) the following people. - Wouter Wijngaards http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01270.html - Sam Weiler http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01357.html - Scott Rose http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01280.html - Andrew Sullivan http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01306.html - Wesley Griffin http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01372.html - Robert Story http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01373.html - Suresh Krishnaswamy http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01311.html At an earlier phase the document has been reviewed by Eric Rescorla. http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/msg01026.html (Eric brought up a number of issues which were argued to be operational issues concerning key handling and not relevant to the protocol described in the draft.) Reviewers have compared the properties of this rollover mechanism with the goals as set in the rollover-requirements draft. The reviewers are satisfied that the threshold-timers document satisfies (see section 5 of draft-ietf-dnsext-rollover-requirements) 1. Scalability 3. General Applicability 4. Support Private Networks 7. Planned and Unplanned Rollovers 8. Timeliness 10. New RR Types (unclear requirement, but no new RR type needed) 11. Support for Trust Anchor Maintenance Operations (accomplishes replace w/ separate add/delete) 12. Recovery From Compromise 13. Non-degrading Trust There have been ('non-blocking') comments about: 5. Stale Trust Anchor Detection Depending on how many revoked DNSKEYs are in the RRset 6. Manual Operations From the resolver point of view the operations may be difficult to perform manually, on the zone-owner side manual operations is not a problem. 9. High Availability In particular the amount of revoked DNSKEYs could increase the size of the DNSKEY RRset to 2. No Intellectual Property Encumbrance Folk have been reluctant to comment on the status of the IPR claims more about this at 4) below. 3) Do you have concerns that the document needs more review from a particular (broader) perspective (e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with AAA, etc.)? We think this document has had sufficient review, also from security savvy reviewers, on the other hand a final review will never hurt. 4) Do you have any specific concerns/issues with this document that you believe the ADs and/or IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps you are uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or whether there really is a need for it, etc., but at the same time these issues have been discussed in the WG and the WG has indicated it wishes to advance the document anyway. The rollover-requirements draft states that the preferred solution should not be IPR encumbered. Mr. Moreau claims that a patent applies (see http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/msg01283.html) The editor does not agree with this statement. We do not know if Mr. Moreau followed the instructions in 6.1.3 of BCP79. Besides, Diversinet claimed IPR (see https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/ipr_search.cgi? option=document_search&document_search=ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-timers) It should also be noted that there were a number of proposals from which this particular draft was selected. This included draft-ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-threshold (covered by the same Diversinet IPR claim) and draft-moreau-dnsext-takrem-dns-02.txt (see https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/ipr_detail_show.cgi?ipr_id=639). The draft-moreau-dnsext-takrem-dns-02 draft was published with a non-derivative clause. The working group has been made aware of the IPR claims and they were not subject to further discussion about applicability. 5) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? The selection for this particular proposal was done during the face-2-face meeting in Montreal and met wide consensus. This consensus was confirmed on-list. Also during the last call there were several folk that supported this document explicitly. 6) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarize what are they upset about. Mr. Moreau has indicated that he would abtain from providing input on this draft because he is not satisfied with the requirements draft. (http://ops.ietf.org/lists/namedroppers/namedroppers.2006/ msg01327.html). He has not threatened with an appeal. 7) Have the chairs verified that the document adheres to _all_ of the ID nits? (see http://www.ietf.org/ID-nits.html). Yes. 8) For Standards Track and BCP documents, the IESG approval announcement includes a writeup section with the following sections: - Technical Summary The document describes a means for automatically updating public keys that are configured in DNSSEC aware resolvers. New trust-anchors are configured when signatures over them can be validated using the previous trust-anchors. By introducing explicit revocation and a delay mechanism the chances of an attacker introducing a mala fide trust-anchor after a key compromise are mitigated, albeit not solved. - Working Group Summary There is a broad consensus that this solution provides a workable key-rollover. The working group is aware IPR issues. - Protocol Quality There are no implementations yet. The chairs are aware of at least 1 and maybe 2 independent organizations that plan on implementing. At least one implementer has done in-depth review during last call. The chairs are of the opinion that after implementations are written there is probably millage in documenting operational experiences. ----------------------------------------------------------- Olaf M. Kolkman NLnet Labs http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/
- Publication request raft-ietf-dnsext-trustupdate-… Olaf M. Kolkman