Re: [dnsext] draft-crocker-dnssec-algo-signal-03 -- more time please!

[Patrik Fältström <[e-mail]>]

On 3 sep 2009, at 07.55, Steve Crocker wrote:

> Thanks for taking on this task.  I am a bit confused about what  
> you're reporting.  I understand there is controversy about whether  
> the WG should be more or less permissive in the admission of new  
> algorithms, but our proposal is neutral with respect to that issue.   
> We propose to include signalling in the query in order to facilitate  
> the phase out of old algorithms when newer ones are being fielded.
>
> It some are arguing that the very existence of the signalling  
> mechanism may open the door to too many algorithms, I want to push  
> back vigorously.  We did not create this proposal in order to  
> facilitate the adoption of more algorithms.  At least some new  
> algorithms are clearly coming, e.g. SHA256 and ECC, so there's no  
> question that we will face one or more transitions.  If there is to  
> be a linkage between our proposal and Paul Hoffman's, it should be  
> in the other direction.  Our proposal should be adopted in all  
> cases.  His proposal should not be adopted unless ours is too.
>
> The only detail that might be affected by future policy is how many  
> algorithm identifiers to anticipate.  I believe we can signal which  
> of 256 different algorithms are known to the requester.  If this is  
> insufficient, then the field that encodes that subset needs to be  
> adjusted.  But I sincerely hope we're not going to come anywhere  
> close to that number in the foreseeable future.
>
> So, can you clarify if you really did get input that tended to push  
> against our proposal because it might be seen as permissive toward  
> admitting new algorithms?

Well, I do not want to use the wording "push back", more that people  
very much wanted more clear text about the fact one such registration  
mechanism (that is good) is NOT opening the flood gates. Having a  
registration mechanism does of course not by itself imply any changes  
in how easy or hard it is to start using a new algorithm.

So, my feeling was that people to feel more comfortable would like to  
see a companion document that clarify this thing, and looks at  
"interoperability issues with multiple encryption algorithms".

They where not against your document per se.

More clear?

    Patrik