Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-fujiwara-dnsop-avoid-fragmentation

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Tue, 14 April 2020 17:33 UTC

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Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 13:32:54 -0400 (EDT)
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Tim Wicinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>
cc: dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, dnsop-chairs <dnsop-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Call for Adoption: draft-fujiwara-dnsop-avoid-fragmentation
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On Tue, 14 Apr 2020, Tim Wicinski wrote:

> This starts a Call for Adoption for draft-fujiwara-dnsop-avoid-fragmentation
> 
> The draft is available here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fujiwara-dnsop-avoid-fragmentation/
> 
> Please review this draft to see if you think it is suitable for adoption
> by DNSOP, and comments to the list, clearly stating your view.
> 
> We are looking for *explicit* support for adoption.

I am in favour of adoption.

> Please also indicate if you are willing to contribute text, review, etc.

I am willing to contribute text and review.

What I find missing is some text to explain that this is only a problem
for legacy DNS not using DNSSEC[*] and perhaps even mention that when
resolvers are setting the +DO flag, then fragmentation should still be
avoided, but that this is no longer a security issue.

I think it is important to point out (again) that this issue would have
been a non-issue if people deploy DNSSEC. If we don't keep hammering
that down, people keep being misguided into believing DNSSEC is
optional and a matter of personal taste.

Paul