Re: [DNSOP] What should ANAME-aware servers do when target records are verifiably missing?

Richard Gibson <richard.j.gibson@oracle.com> Fri, 12 April 2019 18:46 UTC

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From: Richard Gibson <richard.j.gibson@oracle.com>
To: Matthew Pounsett <matt@conundrum.com>
Cc: Bob Harold <rharolde@umich.edu>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>
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Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 14:46:00 -0400
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] What should ANAME-aware servers do when target records are verifiably missing?
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In further support of preserving sibling records when target chasing 
comes back negative, I'd like to further explore my offhand mention of 
"A and/or AAAA records".

For a domain owner wanting to use a currently IPv4-only service provider 
(names withheld) while still supporting IPv6, the logical approach would 
be configuring an ANAME record with one or more AAAA siblings. But that 
won't work if the AAAA NODATA response from chasing the ANAME target is 
allowed to override those siblings with nothing. This seems to force a 
needless choice between abandoning the provider or abandoning IPv6.