Re: [DNSOP] Paul Wouters' Yes on draft-ietf-dnsop-caching-resolution-failures-07: (with COMMENT)

"Wessels, Duane" <dwessels@verisign.com> Wed, 20 September 2023 23:47 UTC

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From: "Wessels, Duane" <dwessels@verisign.com>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
CC: Paul Wouters <paul.wouters@aiven.io>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-dnsop-caching-resolution-failures@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-dnsop-caching-resolution-failures@ietf.org>, "dnsop-chairs@ietf.org" <dnsop-chairs@ietf.org>, "dnsop@ietf.org" <dnsop@ietf.org>, "andrew@depht.com" <andrew@depht.com>
Thread-Topic: [EXTERNAL] [DNSOP] Paul Wouters' Yes on draft-ietf-dnsop-caching-resolution-failures-07: (with COMMENT)
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Date: Wed, 20 Sep 2023 23:47:05 +0000
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Paul Wouters' Yes on draft-ietf-dnsop-caching-resolution-failures-07: (with COMMENT)
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> On Sep 20, 2023, at 2:23 PM, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> 
> 
>>>       To prevent such unnecessary DNS traffic, security-aware resolvers
>>>       MUST cache DNSSEC validation failures, with some restrictions.
>>> 
>>> What are these "some restrictions" ?
>> 
>> Here our intention is to update this statement from RFC 4035 so that MAY
>> becomes MUST and "invalid signatures" becomes "validation failures while
>> leaving the "some restrictions" in place.  AFAICT the restrictions that 4035
>> talks about are using short TTLs (as above) and (I think) to have some
>> query threshold for caching validation failures.  i.e., retry before
>> caching.
> 
> Should some of this make it into the document so the reader understands
> the "some restrictions" ?
> 


Sure, how about this:

   One of the restrictions mentioned in [RFC4035] is to use a small TTL
   when caching data that fails DNSSEC validation.  This is, in part,
   because the provided TTL cannot be trusted.  The advice from
   Section 3.2 herein can be used as guidance on TTLs for caching DNSSEC
   validation failures.

DW