Re: [DNSOP] [Ext] Security Considerations Suggestion for draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc7816bis

[Paul Hoffman <[e-mail]>]

On Mar 31, 2020, at 6:34 AM, Hollenbeck, Scott <shollenbeck=[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> I originally sent this to the list last July. Olafur provided some feedback (which has been incorporated into the text suggested below), but it seems to have slipped past the document editors. Trying again since the document has been revived after it recently expired...
> 
> I've recently been reading draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc7816bis and I'd like to propose some additional text for the Security Considerations section in the spirit of this sentence from the abstract:
> 
> "Future versions of this draft will contain descriptions of different minimisation implementation choices that have been made since the RFC 7816 first came out, as well as deployment experience."
> 
> QNAME minimization has the consequence of reduction in the amount of information seen by authoritative name server operators. Active consideration of that consequence is worth capturing as a factor to be weighed when making the choice to implement QNAME minimization. Here's suggested text:
> 
> "In addition to the performance considerations described in Section 4, there's also a security consideration associated with the reduction of  data sent to parental name servers: they lose some of their ability to assess security threats.  This ability  has proven to be useful in, for example, studies of name collision vulnerabilities.  It was also instrumental in the research that led to the discovery of the JASBUG vulnerability. The reduction will also have an impact on the level of detail available for research studies such as DNS-OARC's annual Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL) data collection exercise.
> 
> For this reason, operators should consider the potential impact on threat analysis and research when reducing the level of detail included in queries to parental name servers. Without such consideration, a collection of individual decisions to reduce query information, over time, may well have the unintended consequence of "deciding" to no longer support threat analysis and research that the operational DNS community has historically relied on.  Alternative mechanisms for facilitating threat analysis and research are beyond the scope of this document."

Sorry for missing that message last year. I remember it now, and I strongly disagree with the wording you propose.

(Disclaimer: ICANN uses the data we see at the root server we operate for security analysis, as does Verisign.)

Privacy-reducing exposure of data almost always can be supported as allowing better monitoring for security. That's always the balance. The folks who run root servers who use the data coming to them for security analysis will naturally want more data. The folks sending queries to the root servers who want more privacy will naturally want to send less data.

It is appropriate to mention this tension in the Security Considerations section. However, because the default is already "send full queries upstream", the current text seems sufficient to alert the reader of the privacy benefits.

Said a different way, if the wording above is needed for this document, it is needed for every document that adds encryption or reduces query traffic; the IETF has not done that much in the past.

--Paul Hoffman