Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for Revised IANA Considerations for DNSSEC

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 12 August 2021 20:53 UTC

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Date: Thu, 12 Aug 2021 16:53:01 -0400
From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
To: Joe Abley <jabley@hopcount.ca>
cc: Tim WIcinski <tjw.ietf@gmail.com>, dnsop <dnsop@ietf.org>, dnsop-chairs <dnsop-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Working Group Last Call for Revised IANA Considerations for DNSSEC
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On Thu, 12 Aug 2021, Joe Abley wrote:

> I think the set of acceptable algorithms is constrained sufficiently often by registries and registrars that it makes little sense to consider any other case.

I think this problem is more easilly solved. You can reach out to them.

>> So my own order of preference is likely something like:
>>
>> 1) Forget about protecting in-bailiwick nameservers
>> 2) Do it securely using DS at parent
>>   (only requires new code for validating nameservers that don't exist yet)
>
> I don't understand what the parenthetical comment here means. You're suggesting that existing validating resolvers that don't know how to interpret a weird algorithm in a DS RRSet received during a referral don't need to be changed?

I'm saying that validators that support SVCB are not there yet, so when
adding SVCB support, they will also add the SVCB-via-DS support. So
the ramp-up will the ramp from "unencrypted resolvers" to "resolvers
with encrypted transport support". The DS hack does not delay that part.
And on the authoritative side, there is no protocol/code change
required (unlike the "SVCB at parent" solution)

Paul