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Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-muks-dnsop-dns-thundering-herd-00.txt

Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> Thu, 25 June 2020 20:14 UTC

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From: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2020 16:14:02 -0400
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References: <20200625200725.GA1081237@mycre.ws>
Cc: Mukund Sivaraman <muks@mukund.org>, Cricket Liu <cricket@infobox.com>, DNSOP@ietf.org
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To: Robert Edmonds <edmonds@mycre.ws>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-muks-dnsop-dns-thundering-herd-00.txt
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On Jun 25, 2020, at 16:07, Robert Edmonds <edmonds@mycre.ws> wrote:


> This seems like a description of a resolver implementation vulnerable to
> the infamous VU#457875. Perhaps an update to the standards track RFC
> 5452 ("Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged Answers")
> would be more appropriate than a new document? That document mentions
> the security problem caused by having multiple outstanding queries for
> the same question but doesn't clearly state a requirement to
> de-duplicate, perhaps because that mitigation was already very common in
> resolver implementations at the time the document was published.

This puzzled me too. Isn’t this a long solved problem? But apparently not, if this is now showing up as it apparently does.

It would be interesting to know which dns implementations are failing here.

Paul

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