Re: [DNSOP] Declaring HTTPS mandatory in the DNS

Kevin Darcy <kcd@chrysler.com> Mon, 19 November 2012 12:33 UTC

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Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2012 07:32:55 -0500
From: Kevin Darcy <kcd@chrysler.com>
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Subject: Re: [DNSOP] Declaring HTTPS mandatory in the DNS
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On 11/19/2012 5:18 AM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> I vaguely remember that there was an Internet-Draft about declaring,
> in the DNS, that a HTTP server MUST be accessed only by HTTPS. But I
> cannot find it, either with the Datatracker or with Google. Any
> pointer?
The closest you're likely to find that is in 
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-jennings-http-srv-05.txt draft (expired), 
where an HTTPS SRV record might be published for a given site, but no 
equivalent HTTP SRV record. That would implicitly be a "declaration" 
that only HTTPS was supported for the site. Honestly though, I foresee 
that even if SRV record lookup is adopted by the browser community, for 
many years after that, browsers will continue to fall back to 
non-SRV-based connection methods. So the absence of an HTTP SRV record 
is not likely to prevent many HTTP connection attempts in the short to 
medium term.
> (I know about draft-ietf-websec-strict-transport-sec, which is a HTTP
> solution, I'm looking for a DNS one.)
>
>
Despite what the Wikipedia page says, that ID doesn't really define a 
"declaration" that HTTPS is preferred over HTTP as the transport to be 
used for accessing a given web host. The use of HTTPS is *assumed*, 
throughout the ID, in order for the mechanisms defined therein to occur, 
e.g. the use of the special "Strict-Transport-Security" HTTP header. The 
only major reference to non-secure HTTP is a generic recommendation 
("SHOULD") to perform a 301 redirect from HTTP to HTTPS (which hardly 
needs an ID callout, since it's _de_facto_ standard anyway). The ID does 
make reference to a possible "HSTS Pre-Loaded List", i.e. a list of 
sites that a browser would know _a_priori_ to implement HSTS, but there 
is no automated mechanism defined to publish/distribute that list, other 
than a vague suggestion (Section 12.3) that site owners and browser 
implementors get together to bake the list into the software "at the 
factory".

                     - Kevin