Re: [DNSOP] public consultation on root zone KSK rollover

[Joe Abley <[e-mail]>]

Hi Tony,

The intention was that those distributing code that relies upon
retrieval of an authentic trust anchor would make arrangements with
ICANN to sign trusted copies of the relevant objects themselves and
have those signatures published alongside the ICANN-generated
signatures.

So, ISC could use the same PGP key as they use to sign BIND9
distributions, Apple could use a key derived from their code-signing
CA, etc. In this way users could have the same trust in the retrieved
trust anchor as they do in the software that has retrieved it.

We have not had significant interest from vendors in developing this
approach, but we remain interested.


Joe

Aue Te Ariki! He toki ki roto taku mahuna!

On 2013-04-06, at 17:22, Tony Finch <[e-mail]> wrote:

> On 6 Apr 2013, at 10:04, Joe Abley <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> On 2013-04-06, at 16:55, Tony Finch <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Validator vendors have to provide an out-of-band trust anchor update mechanism to cope with this. It needs to be coded and included in long-term support releases of validators and operating systems before rollover, I think.
>>
>> draft-jabley-dnsop-validator-bootstrap.
>
> Still needs implementation.
>
> My point about trustworthiness is that there is (as far as I know) no documentation of how the private keys are managed for the certificates / signatures on the trust anchor files, which rather undermines the elaborate root KSK management. I am also worried about being vulnerable to a screwup by any number of CAs; it would be good to pin the list of CA certs that might be used to verify the DNS trust anchor signatures.
>
> Tony.
> --
> f.anthony.n.finch  <[e-mail]>  http://dotat.at/