[DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update

Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com> Fri, 12 April 2019 15:05 UTC

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From: Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>
Message-ID: <ec7ed79a-ae9c-bf6e-3ce7-1b529aa894fa@nthpermutation.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Apr 2019 11:05:37 -0400
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Subject: [DNSOP] draft-ietf-dnsop-algorithm-update
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Hi -

I had someone ask me (last night!!) whether or not the "must sign each 
RRSet with all of the algorithms in the DNSKEY RRSet" rule applies if 
the only key with algorithm A in the RRSet has the revoke bit set.  A 
question I had never previously considered.

Given that you can't trace trust through that revoked key, and any RRSig 
originated by that key is just extraneous bits, I came to three 
conclusions:  1) A key must not be counted for the purposes of the rule 
if it has the (RFC5011) revoke bit set, (s) the only RRSigs created by a 
revoked key are over the DNSKEY RRSet and 3) it's possible/probable that 
interpretations could differ.

I tagged this email with the algorithm update ID/RFC candidate because 
about the only time you're going to see a revoked singleton key of a 
given algorithm is when you're transitioning the algorithms for the zone.

I hesitate to ask - and apologize for asking given the late date for 
this document, but should the statements (1) and (2) above or something 
similar be included in this document for completeness?

Alternatively, what breaks if publishers omit the extraneous signatures 
just because?

Later, Mike